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Treasury Secretary James Baker's
"Program for Sustained Growth" for the
International Debt Crisis: Three Steps
Toward Global Financial Security
I. Introduction
Over the past decade commercial banks have dramatically in-
creased their loans to Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs) 1 in re-
sponse to a corresponding rise in LDC demand for private loans. The
predominant factor in this rise has been the need to finance LDC
balance of payments deficits.2 Since 1982, the LDCs have repeatedly
fallen short in their attempts to maintain payments on their debt
obligations to Western banks. 3 This has triggered a series of
reschedulings4 of this foreign debt and considerable uncertainty as to
the general health of the global economy.
The threat of domestic bank failures, resulting from defaults5
by LDCs on their commercial debts, prompted the United States
Congress in 1983 to enact legislation designed to promote sound
banking practices on the part of United States multinational banks,
1. For the purposes of this comment, "Less Developed Countries" include those coun-
tries of Latin America and the Third World that have borrowed substantial sums from West-
ern commercial banks. References in this comment to debts owed by LDCs include debt obli-
gations of both the LDC governments and their instrumentalities, as well as those of private
borrowers within each LDC.
2. The "balance of payments" refers to the status of a country's international ac-
counts. These international accounts reflect the balance of the country's merchandise, i.e., total
exports of goods less total imports, the balances of services (invisibles), the long-term capital
account, and the short-term capital account. PAYER, THE DEBT TRAP, THE IMF AND THE
THIRD WORLD 6 (1974).
3. Although this comment is primarily concerned with United States' banks, banks
throughout the Western world are in the midst of an international debt crisis resulting from
LDC inability to repay loans.
4. Loan renegotiation usually becomes necessary when a country's foreign reserves
and export earnings are insufficient to cover the cost of imports and debt service, placing the
country on the verge of default. LDCs can attempt to renegotiate loans from any of their three
sources of credit: the International Monetary Fund, governments, and banks. A Nightmare of
Debt, ECONOMIST, March 20, 1982, at Survey 22-37 [hereinafter cited as A Nightmare of
Debt]. Renegotiation can involve rescheduling and refinancing. Id. at 22. Rescheduling entails
extending a debtor's repayment schedule. Id. at 22. Refinancing entails providing new loans to
pay off old ones and is preferred by banks because it allows them to earn additional fees. Id. at
22.
5. "Default" as used in this comment denotes an absolute and final failure by a debtor
state to pay either the interest or the principal due its creditors. To prevent default, creditors
renegotiate the loan by providing additional loans or extending the time for repayment. See
supra note 4.
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* the principal United States lenders to the Third World.6 That legis-
lation, the International Supervision Act of 1983,1 requires federal
banking regulatory agencies to impose restrictions on the foreign
lending practices of domestic banks.8 Through these restrictions
Congress hoped to insure the stability of the United States domestic
banking system.
On October 8, 1985, United States Treasury Secretary James
Baker proposed yet another response to the global debt situation.
Secretary Baker's proposal essentially calls for an international so-
cial compact involving debtor countries, international lending agen-
cies9 and commercial banks. Under the plan debtor countries must
first adopt market-oriented policies aimed at creating "more flexible
and productive economies."' 0 Second, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF)" and the World Bank"2 must encourage these market-
oriented policies in return for additional lending. Finally, commercial
banks must increase loans to the LDCs.
6. According to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, as of June 1983, the 17 United States multinational bank
holding companies included: Bank America Corporation; Bank of Boston Corporation; Bankers
Trust New York Corporation; Chase Manhattan Corporation; Chemical New York Corpora-
tion; Citicorp; First-Chicago Corporation; First Interstate Bancorp; Irving Bank Corporation;
Manufacturers Hanover Corporation; Marine Midland Bank; Mellon National Corporation;
J.P. Morgan & Co., Incorporated; Security Pacific Corp.; and Wells Fargo & Company. See
News Release, Federal Reserve Board, June 13, 1983 reprinted in 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
930, 931 (1983).
7. ILSA § 901-913, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-12 (Supp. 11 1984).
8. See American Bank Regulation: Different Order, Same Chaos, THE ECONOMIST,
Feb. 4, 1984, at 77-78. Under the Current regulatory framework, the Federal Reserve Board
(the Fed) supervises more than 5000 bank holding companies in the United States. Id. at 78.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (COC) regulates nationally chartered banks.
Id. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures bank deposits and regulates
banks which are not members of the Federal Reserve system by setting standards which banks
must meet to qualify for deposit insurance. Id.
9. See infra notes 11-12.
10. PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH: JOINT ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL FUND AND THE WORLD BANK, October 8, 1985 (statement of Secretary of the Trea-
sury, James Baker, III) at 3 [hereinafter cited as PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH] (repro-
duced at Appendix A).
II. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, December 27, 1945, 60
Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was
established at the United Nations Monetary and Finance Conference at Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire in 1944 to encourage international cooperation on monetary matters, including
maintaining stable exchange rates and overseeing the payment of international debts. The
IMF plays the role of both borrower and lender by borrowing money from countries able to
lend and using this money to make loans to needier countries. In addition, the IMF makes
short-term loans to nations rich and poor, with balance of payments deficits in concert with
private banks and individual governments. Whether the IMF makes a loan depends on the
borrowing country's compliance with IMF policy.
12. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 78 [hereinafter cited as
International Bank Agreement]. This bank (known as the World Bank) was also established
by the Bretton Woods agreement. See supra note 11. The Bank makes direct loans for specific
projects such as highways and power plants in developing countries. It currently lends about
twelve billion dollars a year and unlike the IMF, it does not impose tight controls on a bor-
rower's economy.
PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH
This comment will offer a brief overview of the factors leading
up to the present international debt crisis. The second and third
prongs of Secretary Baker's Program for Sustained Growth will then
be analyzed with particular emphasis on the roles Secretary Baker
recommends that the IMF, the World Bank, and multinational com-
mercial lending institutions play in resolving the LDC debt crisis.
Last, actions that must be taken by the LDCs as well as LDC de-
mands for trade liberalization will be discussed, along with the ef-
fects such trade liberalization would have on the LDC debt situation.
II. Background of the Crisis
In 1982 the United States Government and all major American
multinational lending institutions 3 publicly acknowledged that a
debt crisis severe enough to threaten the entire United States bank-
ing system existed in loans extended to third world nations. That
crisis, and the threat it imposes on the American way of business is
still continuing and has been exacerbated by global economic
conditions.
The essence of the problem is that most, if not all, of the major
lending institutions in the United States advanced huge amounts of
money to Third World Nations. It now is clear that those nations are
unable to repay those loans.
A. The Source of the Problem
Lending to the LDCs took off in 1973-74 when the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced oil price
increases. The OPEC nations deposited the surplus cash generated
by these price increases in Western commercial banks. 14 The com-
mercial banks then needed to find suitable borrowers to use the ex-
cess cash.
International lenders settled on LDCs as the main recipient of
the excess petrodollars because many of the LDCs appeared
creditworthy. 15 The more developed LDCs in particular - Mexico,
13. See supra note 6.
14. Gilpin, Oil Cut to Hurt Poorer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 1983, at D1, Col. 3.
The inflow of dollars and other currencies as a result of oil price increases far exceeded the
amounts OPEC members needed to pay for imports. Therefore, they sought ways to invest
their oil earnings. Unwilling to bear the risk and trouble of direct lending to oil-importing
LDCs, OPEC members deposited a substantial portion of their surplus in United States banks
and their overseas branches. From 1974-1976, OPEC members deposited $49 billion of their
surplus in commercial banks. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95th Con-
gress, Ist Sess., REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL DEBT, THE BANKS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 14-
15 (Comm. Print 1977). In the years 1977 through 1979 the oil-exporting states invested an
even larger part of their surplus of $99.7 billion, about $15.9 billion accumulated in Britain as
Eurocurrency deposits. United States banks received $6.1 billion and bank deposits in other
states amounted to $28.9 billion. IMF SURVEY, July 7, 1980, at 212.
15. Until about 1975 Latin American states performed fairly well in terms of a pri-
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Brazil and Argentina - had established substantial industrial bases
and "enjoyed economic growth rates."6 Moreover, these more devel-
oped states contained vast natural resources and showed a significant
potential for continued growth. The banks assumed that such growth
would generate the revenue necessary to repay external debts. 7
The LDCs welcomed the petrodollars. Commercial credit was
greatly preferred over loans from such institutions as the IMF be-
cause it was generally advanced without any conditions attached.
The IMF, by contrast, typically conditioned large drawings from its
currency reserves on the recipient state's agreement to institute an
austerity program. 18 These austerity programs were designed to in-
crease the borrowing country's ability to earn enough foreign ex-
change with which to repay the IMF. 9 Such programs often de-
mary indicator of credit-worthiness - the ratio of external debt payments to exports (debt-
service ratio). Pine, International Bankers Take Steps to Restore Faith in their System,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1982, at 1, Col. 6.
16. Between 1950 and 1980 gross domestic product (GDP) of developing countries in-
creased at an annual rate of 5.4% which represents a remarkable performance compared with
the pre-war period. TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT, Report by the Secretariat of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 33 (1981).
17. H. Wallich, International Lending and the Role of Bank Supervisory Cooperation:
Remarks at the International Conference of Banking Supervisors 3 (Sept. 24, 1981) (quoted in
Reisner, Default by Foreign Sovereign Debtors: An Introductory Perspective, 1982 U. ILL.
L.F. 5). Dr. Wallich commented on the extent to which banks may have underestimated the
risks of lending to foreign sovereigns:
['lt is sometimes thought that the usual rules of lending risk do not apply to
sovereign borrowers. It has been said that lending to countries is less risky than
lending to businesses or individuals because a country, unlike a business or indi-
vidual, will always be around. Country lending, it is sometimes said, is free of
final bankruptcy and definitive loss. All that is needed is occasional rescheduling
that gives the lender breathing space and does not significantly affect the earn-
ings or capital of the lending banks, In my judgment, this is too complacent an
attitude.
18. Robichek, The International Monetary Fund: An Arbiter in the Debt Restructur-
ing Process, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143, 149 (1984).
The IMF is an inter-governmental institution in which creditor and debtor coun-
tries are joined, whereas banks in most cases are privately owned and responsible
to their private depositors and stockholders whose interests they must protect.
The tasks of the IMF are basically regulatory in the area of the exchange rates
and exchange practices of its member countries, and are advisory in these and
other areas of public policy that affect their balance of payments positions. Its
financial resources are intended to help these countries abide by the code of
international conduct which the IMF has developed and continues to develop in
the public policy areas within its jurisdiction. The banks are profit-oriented fi-
nancial institutions . ...
Given its regulatory and advisory tasks, the IMF imposes conditionality in
all public policy areas that are relevant to a country's balance of payment per-
formance. This is not only intended to ensure debt repayment, but a country's
financial recovery to the point where repayment imposes less strain on it than
does the relief from strain provided by the financial assistance. The undertakings
which banks exact from borrowers essentially are confined to the financial and
legal terms of the loan and satisfactory assurance of loan repayment, but as
experience has shown, without sufficient consideration of the strain which loan
repayment imposes on the borrowing country.
19. Programs of conditionality impose economic austerity measures on LDCs and
thereby reduce the risk of default on their loans from banks. Under a program of conditional-
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pressed domestic economic growth and proved politically
unpopular." Unconditional financing by commercial banks thus per-
mitted LDCs to avoid the economically and politically painful aus-
terity measures required by IMF financing.
The availability of petrodollars and the lack of conditions placed
on commercial financing induced LDC commercial borrowing to
soar after 1973. By 1980, commercial banks had extended in excess
of 40 billion dollars in loans to non-oil exporting LDCs, a 300 per-
cent rise in lending over seven years.2 By the end of the decade, the
nine largest United States banks held loans to LDC accounting for
over 200 percent of the bank's capital.2 2 The exposure of the next




The lending campaign which began with the OPEC price in-
creases contained the seeds of the present crisis. Since banks lent to
LDCs at low loan spreads,24 a relatively small default threatened to
erase any profit made on those loans. A somewhat larger default
would cut into other revenues and perhaps even into bank equity.
Furthermore, the banks had concentrated on lending to a few of the
more developed LDCs . 5 Later, these low spreads and high loan con-
ity, the IMF and the LDC formulate and impose austerity measures after considering the
LDCs' social, political and economic considerations. Gold, Balance of Payments Transactions
of the International Monetary Fund in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW 237, 242-44 (R.
Rendell ed. 1980). These measures are intended to correct the LDCs' balance of payments
deficits within a specified time period - usually one to three years. The more commonly used
measures include: currency devaluation, restrictions on subsidy programs and other govern-
ment spending, modification of wage and price controls, ceilings on expansion of credit by the
central bank and limits on additional external borrowing. Guitian, Fund Conditionality and
the International Adjust Process: the Changing Environment of the 1970"s, FINANCE & DE-
VELOPMENT, March 1981, at 8, 1I. See generally J. GOLD, CONDITIONALITY (IMF PAMPHLET
SERIES No. 31, 1979) [hereinafter cited as IMF PAMPHLET SERIES No. 31].
20. Conditionality imposes political, economic and social costs. See generally IMF
PAMPHLET SERIES No. 31, supra note 19, at 14-15. These costs can prove too high for LDCs
and in some cases the LDC abandons the program or attempts to circumvent the process by
borrowing the needed funds from private sources. Id. at 14. In such cases, because effective
economic adjustments are not made, the LDCs' continuing deficits must be financed by in-
creasingly larger borrowings. Adede, Loan Agreements between Developing Countries and
Foreign Commercial Banks - Reflections on Some Legal and Economic Issues, 5 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L. L. & COM. 235, 243-246 (1978). See also, The IMF and Latin America, THE ECONO-
MIST, Dec. I1, 1982 at 69-76 [hereinafter cited as The IMF and Latin America]; Brazil: The
Morning After, THE ECONOMIST, March 12, 1983, at 3.
21. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (BIS), FIFTY-FIRST ANNUAL RE-
PORT, 1980/81 (Table 3.20) (1982).
22. Dod, Bank Lending to Developing Countries, 67 FED. RES. BULL. 647, 655 (1981).
23. Id. at 647, 650. Latin American countries accounted for some 55% of the total debt
at the end of 1982. The Maze of Latin American Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1983 § 3, at 4,
col. 3.
24. A "loan spread" is the difference between the rate of interest on a loan and the
return a bank pays on its deposits or other sources of funds.
25. In June 1982, for example, the top five Latin American borrowers - Mexico, Bra-
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centrations made withdrawal from further lending to the LDCs all
but impossible. 6
Many events after 1980 magnified the dangers created by these
lending policies, the most significant of which was the increase in the
United States interest rates.17 The rates depressed commodity prices
by discouraging importers from maintaining inventories. Demand for
commodities fell, prices declined, and LDC export earnings dropped
considerably. 8 Surpluses of OPEC deposits were also depleted as oil
prices fell, further contracting the availability of credit. 9
Meanwhile, LDCs had employed much of their borrowed money
to pursue projects which did not generate foreign exchange.30 Sched-
uled repayments accumulated well beyond the LDCs' ability to meet
zil, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela - accounted for 91% of total lending by United States
banks to the entire region. The two largest debtors - Mexico and Brazil - accounted for
almost 66% of the total. Heineman, Third-World Debt Problem, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 1983,
at DI, col. 3. For a summary of the exposure faced by United States banks, see Volcker, The
Recycling Problem Revisited, CHALLENGE, Jul.-Aug. 1980, at 3; Bennet, Top Bank's Third
World Loans Detailed, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 1983, at D3, col. 1.
26. The banks had invested so much money in LDC loans that the continued viability
of the banks themselves depended on LDC loan repayments. See Quirk, The Big Bank
Bailout, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 21, 1983, at 19.
27. A growing number of commercial loans provided for floating interest rates. Each
percentage point of increase in interest rates therefore represents an additional foreign ex-
change outflow for LDCs paying interest on their loans. Problems of the International Debt:
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 63 (1984) (statement of Vice President - Overseas Development Council Richard E.
Feinberg) [hereinafter cited as International Debt Problems). Floating interest rates on LDC
loans are calculated in two steps. First, a formula in the loan agreement is used to arrive at the
London Interbank Rate, the "LIBOR" or "base" rate, for a given interest period. The "mar-
gin" or "spread," a percentage in excess of LIBOR fixed by the loan contract, then is added to
the base rate. See Mitchell & Wall, The Eurodollar Market: Loans and Bonds, INTERNA-
TIONAL FINANCIAL LAW 53, 62 (R. Rendell ed. 1980). The average spread above LIBOR on
LDC loans between 1973 and 1981 ranged from approximately 0.8% to 1.6%. A Nightmare of
Debt, supra note 4 at Survey 77 (chart). As the LIBOR rate fluctuates to reflect banks' in-
creased capital costs, LDCs bear higher interest rates on their loans.
High interest rates caused by United States budget deficits directly hurt developing coun-
tries because they determine the interest rates developing countries have to pay. In addition,
these rates indirectly hurt developing countries by strengthening the dollar and reducing the
dollar price for which the LDCs can sell their goods. While their products are bringing in
fewer dollars, the dollar amount of their debt remains unchanged. See International Debt
Problems, supra note 27, at 7 (statement of Senior Fellow, Institute of International Econom-
ics William R. Cline).
28. See supra note 27. Falling oil prices, for example, threatened imminent default for
Mexico, which depended on petroleum sales for 70% of its export earnings. And in Latin
America interest payments in 1983 totalled approximately $40 billion. That number repre-
sented about 42% of all Latin American export earnings. See Kuynski, Latin American Debt:
Act Two, 62 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 18, 19 (1983).
29. Hershey, Mideast Oil States Feeling Pinch. Said to Reduce Western Holdings,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1983, at Al, Col. 4.
30. Gilpin, The Maze of Latin America's Debt, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 1983, § 3, at 4
Col. 3. One commentator summarized the phenomenon as follows:
Instead of using the loans to build up export industries, many of the large Latin
American borrowers decided to invest in those things that could service domestic
markets. Improving roads, transportation, and other basic infrastructure
projects, as well as raising private consumption were also important objectives.
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them."1 The banks, concerned about a potential default, began to
curtail new credit extensions.32 In the United States, many small re-
gional banks that had followed larger banks by lending to LDCs
through syndicated loans 33 all but cut off further loans.34
As the LDCs accumulated these large external debts and even
higher debt-service ratios, the following pattern emerged: 1) the
debtor state allowed its financial conditions to deteriorate until it was
unable to meet interest payments; 2) the commercial bank lenders
then refused to reschedule or refinance loans unless the debtor state
agreed to IMF conditions, which central bankers encouraged;3 5 3)
debtors officially requested IMF assistance and accepted an IMF
prescribed austerity program that lowered the domestic standard of
living and facilitated social and political discourse;38 and 4) the lend-
ing institution, with much apprehension, gave new credit or resched-
uled the debt. The resulting new loans carried relatively short terms,
high interest rates, and large renegotiation fees.
III. Secretary Baker's Program for Sustained Growth
On October 8, 1985, the United States Treasury Secretary
James Baker addressed the Joint Annual Meeting of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 7 Without criticizing the
actions of the commercial banks, Secretary Baker proposed an alter-
native response to the global debt situation. Mr. Baker's proposal
contained three prongs and essentially called for an international so-
cial compact involving debtor countries, international lending agen-
cies and commercial banks. Under the first prong of Mr. Baker's
proposal, debtor countries would be required to adopt market-ori-
ented policies aimed at creating more flexible and productive econo-
31. Almost 35% of total Latin American debt - or $103.8 billion of $297.1 billion fell
due in 1983. Id.
32. The slowdown in lending to LDCs began in late 1979 and early 1980 when "con-
cerns about general economic developments led banks to seek out borrowers with the highest
credit standing." Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) foresees
decline in International Lending to Some $100 billion, IMF SURVEY., Aug. 4, 1980, at 236-
237.
33. Syndications divide a loan among a number of participating banks and thus diver-
sify the individual bank's portfolios by spreading the risk among the lenders. See A. ANGELINI,
M. ENG & F. LEES, INTERNATIONAL LENDING, RISK OF THE EUROMARKETS, 84-88 (1979).
34. Bennet, Less Risk More Worry for the Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1982 § 3, at 1,
Col. 3.
35. Since 1956, the Paris Club, an organization of central bankers that has played a
significant role in the rescheduling of debtor nation loans, for example, usually insists that a
debtor state agree to an IMF austerity program before the Club will assist the debtor in
rescheduling its debt. For more on the Paris Club, see A Nightmare of Debt, supra note 4, at
22-41.
36. See supra notes 19-20.
37. This speech was given in Seoul, Korea where Secretary Baker focused his com-
ments on policies for growth within the context of the international debt strategy.
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mies. Under the second, the IMF 8 and the World Bank39 would en-
courage these new market-oriented policies in return for additional
lending. The final element of the plan requires commercial lending
institutions, generally multinational banks located in the United
States, to increase their lending to the debtor nations.
The following analysis of Secretary Baker's Program deals first
with the second prong and the importance of the IMF and the
World Bank to the success of the Secretary's proposal. Then the
third prong and what commercial lending institutions must do is an-
alyzed. Last, LDC requests for trade liberalization will be discussed
in light of the international debt crisis.
A. The Second Prong - The Importance of the IMF and the
World Bank
1. The IMF.-The IMF engaged in its first lending operations in
1947. The IMF's negotiated austerity programs, however, were not
initiated until the latter portion of the 1950's,o a few years after the
creation of the standby arrangement. The process used in those ne-
gotiations and the results they achieved established the principle of
conditionality now imposed in all typical IMF lending operations.'
During the next decade, the IMF began to play a catalytic role
by helping member countries raise external finances from other
sources.42 The principle of conditionality was an important underpin-
ning to the IMF's role as a catalyst.43
Secretary Baker's proposal heightens the importance of the
IMF and the role it plays. Under the plan the IMF, instead of
merely seeking to avert defaults by debtor nations, would take the
initiative in finding long term solutions to the problems of interna-
tional debt. It would do this by creating an interest rate compensa-
tory financing facility" and by assisting in the coordination of the
38. See supra text accompanying note Ii.
39. See supra text accompanying note 12.
40. See IMF PAMPHLET SERIES No. 31, supra note 19, at 10.
41. See supra note 19. See also J. GOLD, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM; SELECTED ESSAYS 412 (1979); J. Richardson, UNDER-
STANDING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 72 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS].
42. See INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 41, at 73.
43. Currently, the IMF certifies the propriety of a country's economic management by
committing its own resources in support of an adjustment program. This endorsement tends to
assure would-be foreign lenders and investors that the country's external account position is, or
is approaching, sustainability. See PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH, supra note 10, at IV.
44. Many of the LDCs' recent problems in serving their debt stem from abrupt in-
creases in real interest rates within lending countries. In order to offset increases in the LDCs'
debt burden generated by rising real interest rates, the IMF should establish a Compensatory
Financing Facility (CFF). See A Debt Partnership, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 2, 1983, at 9. A
given rise in interest rates would trigger the LDCs' ability to draw from the CFF, thus com-
pensating LDCs for debt serving costs generated by measures beyond their control.
[Vol. 4:2
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monetary policies of its member states. 5
The IMF is the logical choice to assume this role because it is
the only institution which combines the functions necessary for the
successful adjustment of LDC balance of payments through the use
of major debt financing.46 The IMF also has the requisite legitimacy
needed to carry out this role. It is the international organization
through which 146 states have provided a pool of funds for meeting
their transitional financial needs. 7 Its member states thus generally
regard the IMF as the appropriate vehicle for evaluating their na-
tional economic programs."8
In 1982 the role the IMF played in averting LDC defaults illus-
trates the central position that the IMF has already assumed in ad-
dressing these types of problems. Throughout that year, the IMF
provided short-term emergency credit to debt-burdened LDCs that
were unable to service the interest on their external debt and were
forced by their commercial creditors to go to the IMF for assis-
tance. 9 Without IMF intervention, commercial lenders would have
refused to renegotiate outstanding debts or to extend new loans to
pay for food, energy and other needed imports. 50 Thus, resort to the
IMF became essential to the LDCs.
A new phase in the relationship between the IMF and commer-
cial banks began in 1984 with the conclusion of the multi-year re-
45. Regarding the IMF's suitability to coordinate the monetary policies of its member
states, Secretary Baker stated:
The IMF played a major role in advising member nations in the development of
policies necessary to promote adjustment and growth. Emphasizing growth does
not mean deemphasizing the IMF. Through both its policy advice and balance of
payments financing, the Fund has played a critical role in encouraging needed
policy changes and catalyzing capital flows. It must continue to do so. One such
aspect of this role would entail member nation cooperating by maintaining uni-
formity of interest rates. Such coordination would stabilize the LDCs debt pay-
ments and their ability to plan for long-term economic growth.
See PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH, supra note 10, at IV.
46. Volcker, 69 FED. RES. BULL. 80, 82 (Feb. 1983).
47. id.
48. Id. In addition, it is essential for the debtor nations that the IMF undertake this
role. The international financial institutions (i.e., the IMF) must continue to implement lend-
ing practices promoting adjustment and growth in conjunction with the debtor nation's deci-
sion to restructure their economies. These efforts should be mutually enforcing. See PROGRAM
FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH, supra note 10, at 11. Sound policies in the principal debtor countries
will not only promote growth, but will also stimulate the needed private bank lending. Id.
Moreover, it will be important that these policies be supported by the IMF, complemented by
the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). These institutions can help encourage and cata-
lyze both needed policies and financing, Id. at II.
49. Government officials realized that only an agreement with the IMF to undertake
internal austerity measures would restore the confidence of commercial lenders. See The IMF
and Latin America, supra note 20, at 69.
50. Id. See also Hoge, Debt Crisis Forces Suit by Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1982 at
DI, Col. 6; Schumaker, Argentina Agrees on Spending Cuts to Cut IMF Loan, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 1982 at AI, Col. 1; IMF SURVEY, March 21, 1983, at 92-93; IMF SURVEY, March 7,
1983, at 65; Schumaker, Argentina's Debt: Why Banks Worry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. I, 1982 at
Dl, Col. 2.
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structuring agreement (MYRA) for Mexico. This agreement was in-
tended to lay the foundation for a resumption of "spontaneous""
bank lending by stretching the principal maturities falling due in the
next few years over a longer period of time.5 2 As part of the agree-
ment, Mexico asked the IMF for "enhanced surveillance" from 1986
to 1990 after the present extended IMF arrangement expires in
1985.
All IMF members are currently subject to some surveillance in
the form of an annual staff review of their economic situations, pros-
pects and policies. On the basis of "Article Four consultations,"" a
staff reports are prepared and discussed by the IMF Board of Direc-
tors. These reports are available, however, only to the governments
of the member countries.
The "enhanced surveillance" established under the Mexican
MYRA differs from the above form of surveillance in two respects.
In addition to a full-fledged Article IV consultation and staff report
to review Mexico's program and policy targets for the year ahead,
there will be a mid-year review of the progress achieved against the
plan. Secondly, the IMF staff reports will also be made available to
Mexico's creditor banks as well as to IMF member governments. 4
This "enhanced surveillance" concept greatly increased the central
role of the IMF in determining international debt strategy.
The IMF has made it clear, however, that commercial banks
cannot expect "on/off" 55 signals from enhanced surveillance. The
51. In a number of cases, commercial banks conditioned their own loan commitments
or disbursements on those of the IMF. Since IMF disbursements are only made when specific
performance criteria are met, this was tantamount to the banks linking their lending to "on/
off" signals from the IMF. This was the exception rather than the rule, however. Most bank
lending before 1982 was "spontaneous" and most borrowing countries were not subject to IMF
conditionality. See INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE OVERVIEW, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1985) at
5 [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL FINANCE]. (For a discussion on the Institute of Inter-
national Finance see infra text accompanying note 149.)
52. See supra note 4.
53. Under the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, the Fund is charged with overseeing
the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective operation. See International
Bank Agreement, supra note 12. 60 STAT. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 15d, 2 U.N.T.S. Article IV,
Section 3(b) provides that "the Fund shall exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate
policies of members and shall adopt specific principles for the guidance of all members with
respect to those policies." THE IMF ANNUAL REPORT 61 (1983). In general, Fund surveillance
focuses on the examination of the overall economic situation of a member county in order to
access the appropriateness of its policies with respect both to the sustainability of its external
position and to the effects on other member countries. Id. at 61-62.
54. The "enhanced surveillance" concept is a recent phenomenon. It is impossible to
say how many countries will ultimately be subject to "enhanced" IMF surveillance. Enhanced
surveillance will only be available if a country asks the IMF for it and if the IMF Board of
Directors agrees to the request. Another qualification for enhanced IMF surveillance would be
that the country have a good adjustment record and already have made considerable progress
down this road. A further condition would probably require that the country in question have
concluded a multi-year restructuring agreement with its bank creditors. See INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE, supra note 51, at 6.
55. Id.
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IMF will not establish performance criteria for debtor nations and
indicate when they are violated. Enhanced surveillance will therefore
not provide the "on/off" signals given by standard IMF arrange-
ments. 5 6 Commercial banks will have to make individual credit as-
sessments and decisions concerning the appropriate link between the
economic performance of the debtor nation and any future lending
activity.
Notwithstanding these reservations, Secretary Baker promoted
the concept of enhanced surveillance in a statement before the
House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs:
Our debt strategy has emphasized the need to reduce both exter-
nal and domestic imbalances to help lay the basis for longer-
term growth. This has required a strong central role for the IMF
in debt strategy. That central role should continue, as a means
of encouraging needed policy changes and catalyzing capital
flows. In some cases, the use of "enhanced surveillance" may
provide a sound basis for catalyzing financing in support of good
performers.57
Under Secretary Baker's proposed Program, then, the IMF
would play a primary role.
2. The World Bank.-The World Bank's58 operations are in
many ways similar to those of a commercial bank. It is a profit-
making institution that borrows and lends at close to market rates of
interest.
The Bank's equity consists of paid-in capital from the member
countries and retained earnings, in approximately equal parts. 9 The
Bank has never paid dividends to its members, but rather chooses to
retain its earnings to support additional lending.60
The Bank's resources, in addition to its equity, come from bor-
rowing. About thirty percent of the Bank's debt is held by central
banks and governments, who hold its obligations as part of their for-
eign exchange reserves.6 1 The remainder is borrowed on private mar-
56. The relations between the International Monetary Fund and a borrowing country
have long played an important role in determining the lending policies of commercial banks
and other official lenders. Conclusion of a stand-by arrangement is considered the IMF's seal
of approval and is confidence building measure. In the few cases in which banks had agreed to
reschedule a country's principal maturities before 1982, the IMF played an instrumental role
in bringing about such restructurings as these were generally contingent on the conclusion of
an IMF supported adjustment program for the country in question. See id. at 5.
57. See Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, October
22, 1985, at 4 (statement of Secretary of the Treasury James Baker) [hereinafter cited as
Treasury News].
58. See supra text accompanying note 12.
59. See Clausen, A Financial Appraisal of the Bank, 19 FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT 9
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kets all over the world. The Bank asserts that its private debt is
highly diversified by country, currency, source, maturity and tech-
nique of borrowing.62 The average maturity of its debt is seven years,
at fixed rates of interest.63 By contrast, commercial bank borrowing
is primarily short-term and is often matched against variable rate
loans." '
The World Bank is in business for the purpose of making loans.
The Bank lends to developing countries at a profitable rate of inter-
est,65 almost always for specific projects66 which would not be fi-
nanced by private markets. The World Bank works closely with a
country to develop and appraise a project, providing technical assis-
tance and advice. This process takes, on average, more than two
years before a project is submitted for loan approval. 7 There has
never been a default or loss on a World Bank loan, in part, because
of the Bank's careful preparation.68
To date, private banks and the IMF have been the principal
agents in dealing with current LDC debt-payment problems. The
World Bank has largely remained uninvolved with either the prob-
lem or the solution. The Bank has mainly concentrated on turning
substantial profits on its project loans. For its size, however, - $60
billion in subscribed capital and 5800 employees - the Bank is a
relatively small lender, providing only approximately $12 billion a
year to countries whose debt exceeds $600 billion.69
Under Secretary Baker's proposal, the role of the World Bank
would change, shifting the emphasis in lending away from belt-tight-
ening and rapid repayment70 and toward longer-term loans. Secre-
tary Baker's Program also envisions a change in the World Bank's
lending criteria to emphasize structural changes in the borrowing
62. Id.
63. Borrowing from the World Bank at a predetermined price is an invaluable cer-
tainty, See A Bank for All Seasons, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 1982, at Survey 18 [hereinafter
cited as A Bank for All Seaons].
64. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
65. The terms of the loans, while profitable for the World Bank, are usually better than
those available from the commercial banks because of the World Bank's ability to borrow on
favorable terms from low inflation, low interest rate countries like Japan, Germany, Switzer-
land and, at one time, the United States. See A Bank For All Seasons, supra note 63,,at
Survey 24-25.
66. As a major project lender, the World bank has extended $90 billion of credit to
developing countries on a project financing basis. Id. A Financial Appraisal of the Bank,
supra note 59, at 9.
67. A Financial Appraisal of the Bank, supra note 59, at 9.
68. Id.
69. Scherschel, A New Try at Curing World's Debt Problems, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Oct. 21, 1985, at 35.
70. The World Bank has recognized that long-term adjustment in external payments
deficits could be accomplished either by reducing programs for investment and development,
which conflicted with its mandate, or by providing a program of financial measures and struc-
tural adjustments supported by external borrowing. See Bank Head Pushed Policy of Growth,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1985, at AI0, col. 6.
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countries' economies. This would encourage, for example, develop-
ment of private enterprise and a reduction in state-owned
businesses.
71
At the same time, Secretary Baker wants the Bank to undertake
more co-financing - joining private banks for the purpose of partici-
pating in private lending. To encourage private banks to join in such
lending, the Administration, under Secretary. Baker's Program,
would ask the World Bank to provide loan guarantees to qualified
LDCs. Last summer, the World Bank provided such guarantees on
$150 million in loans to Chile.
Secretary Baker also recommended in his Program 73 that a seri-
ous effort to coordinate the programs of the World Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 74 be undertaken. Working
together, the two situations could increase the disbursements to prin-
cipal debtors by roughly fifty percent from the current annual level
of 12 billion.
7 5
If lending increases, as envisioned in Secretary Baker's plan,
then both the World Bank and the IDB will be required to borrow in
world capital markets. The ability to borrow at low rates that these
institutions currently enjoy is an asset that must be maintained.7 6
Therefore, any new lending undertaken by the IDB and World Bank
must support sound economic programs that enhance the borrower's
ability to service its debt and grow.
77
71. Secretary Baker has suggested that such methods as divestment of state-owned in-
dustries and lowering tax rates would facilitate positive structural changes in LDC economies.
See PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH, supra note 10, at IV. See also Baker Steers a New
Course, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 62 [hereinafter cited as New Course]; Riding, Brazil Acts to
Tame State Ownership, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1985, at D8. The debtor nations must also take
measures to slow down their capital flight so that money from their new loans does not simply
go into foreign bank accounts. New Course, supra.
72. The World Bank coaxed private banks to lend more to Chile by itself underwriting
the later years of a big loan rescheduling package. See World Bank is Under Pressure From
U.S. to Expand Its Role in Global Debt Crisis, WALL ST. J. Oct. 1, 1985, at 36. In addition,
the World Bank recently put into effect a fifteen year proposal to attract foreign investment in
Third World countries by guaranteeing the foreigners' stakes against expropriation. However,
these efforts have been timid. Id.
73. PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH, supra note 10, at V.
74. The Inter-Development Bank (IDB) was founded in 1959 to aid in the development
of Latin America. The IDB provides a multilateral mechanism for the transfer of capital to
developing states as an alternative to other assistance and permits' the lending of funds on the
basis of relatively neutral economic and financial criteria. Moreover, IDB credit provides fi-
nancing which is consistent with the requirements of long-term development plans. See Kras-
ner, Power Structure and Regional Development Banks, 35 INT'L ORGAN. 305-316 (1981).
Secretary Baker stated that since the most serious debt programs are found in Latin
America, "special emphasis should be placed on strengthening the IDB's policies to enable it
to be a more effective partner in support of growth-oriented structural reform. See PROGRAM
FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH, supra note 10, at IV.
75. See PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH, supra note 10, at IV.
76. See supra note 65.
77. In order to facilitate increased lending by the IDB and the World Bank, it would
be critical to assess the extent to which the institutions strengthen their lending policies. There
must be well-defined economic and country strategies tailored to enhance economic reforms
Spring 1986]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
3. Present Outlook for the IMF and World Bank.-Both the
IMF and the World Bank are being called upon under Secretary
Baker's Program to create solutions to serious international debt
problems. There is a real danger, however, that new lending activity
will merely postpone essential adjustments in the balance of pay-
ments and the structure of the economies of the debtor nations."
The IMF and World Bank should tailor their lending programs
to provide support for economic structural adjustments. These struc-
tural adjustments would permit the LDCs' balance of payments to
accommodate growth and development. 79 The value of the lending
by these institutions exceeds mere monetary value. Through techni-
cal advice and assistance and through the discipline imposed as con-
ditions of the loans, the IMF and World Bank promote national pro-
grams for growth that otherwise would not be implemented. 80
Moreover, the additional confidence in the economy that is generated
by these programs helps to maintain a flow of private capital.8
The United States economy is increasingly dependent on ex-
ports, and the LDCs constitute a large and growing market for
American products. As a percentage of gross national product,
United States exports have more than doubled in the last twenty
years, 82 and in 1981 twenty-nine percent of those exports were sold
to developing countries, compared with only twenty-four percent in
1973.83 As accurately envisioned by Secretary Baker's proposal,
United States interests would be best served by continuing its strong
financial support of the world community through the IMF and the
World Bank.84 Using these instrumentalities, lending programs could
within LDCs which encourage growth. See PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH, supra note
10, at V.
78. Increase in lending to debtor nations who fail to make any economic readjustment
efforts will be fruitless. "Countries which are not prepared to undertake basic adjustments and
work within the framework of the case-by-case debt strategy, cooperating with the interna-
tional financial institutions, cannot expect to benefit from this three-point program." Id. at V.
79. "The core of any successful effort lies in the adjustment actions of the borrowing
countries themselves - all else rests on the perception and the reality of their own efforts to
rebuild a base for sustained growth with reduced reliance on external funds." See Interna-
tional Debt Problems, supra note 27, at 103 (statement of Paul Volcker). In most cases, those
actions have been constructed in cooperation with, and have received the financial support of,
the International Monetary Fund. Id.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
81. The immediate cause of the debt problem - the global recession and high interest
rates - coincided with the planning decision by many banks to place lower priority on lending
to developing countries. The need then is to strengthen the confidence of depositors and inves-
tors in international capital markets and to restore the creditworthiness of the major debtor
nations. The objectives must be to minimize current losses, to create conditions that will per-
mit debtors to maintain debt service and resume growth, and to build international structures
favorable to a renewal of sound lending patterns. THE IMF ANNUAL REPORT 61 (1983).
82. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 184-189,
186 (1982).
83. Id.
84. Farnsworth, U.S. May Back Higher Lending by World Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
1985, at AI, col. 5. The United States proposed $500 million over the next three years to be
[Vol. 4:2
PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH
be assured to be as effective as possible, promoting adjustment and
growth for the economies of the LDCs.
B. The Third Prong - Increased Lending by Commercial Banks
1. Providing New Money.-A successful resolution of the debt cri-
sis requires global economic recovery and the implementation of aus-
terity programs by the governments of debtor countries. The debt
crisis will also be resolved only if commercial banks are willing to
roll over 85 and restructure86 existing debts and increase net lending
to troubled borrowers. 87 New money is essential to a non-disruptive
adjustment process.
Bank directors and management have legal and economic re-
sponsibilities to shareholders and depositors. If new money is in the
best interests of the bank, it must also be in the best interests of the
shareholders and depositors. The conclusion that new money will re-
duce a bank's long term exposure while preserving and securing fu-
ture business with the restructuring debtor and its domestic industry
justifies the supply of fresh money.88
There is, however, no necessity, incentive, or legal requirement
for banks to contribute new money in the same ratio as their original
loan participation.89 Supplying fresh money may also be unaccept-
put into a special five billion dollar fund that Secretary Baker is expected to propose to help
the poorest countries. A first year United States offering could be $75 million. This money
would not need approval by Congress" because it would be part of a bilateral assistance pro-
gram of the United States.
85. "Roll-over" is the process by which banks, instead of demanding payment when a
remittance of principal falls due, renew loans and thus delay ultimate repayment. Banks do
not, however, officially roll-over interest payments, but they do convert those payments into
new loans, with similar results.
86. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
87. During the first half of 1982, international bank lending increased at roughly the
same rate as in the first half of 1981; but the growth of bank lending, especially to developing
countries, dropped in the second half of the year. Total net bank lending to the non-oil devel-
oping countries, which had reached about $50 billion in 1980 and 1981, declined to $25 billion
in 1982, with only $6 billion occurring in the last six months of that year. THE IMF ANNUAL
REPORT 77 (1983).
88. A bank's willingness to contribute new money depends on its regulatory and ac-
counting systems, earnings performance, capital levels and reserve positions. One commentator
stated that the decision to commit new money is really based on the diagnosis of whether the
current debt problem is an insolvency or an illiquidity problem. For a country, insolvency
exists if the future stream of export earnings under reasonable conditions is inadequate to
enable the country to meet expected debt service payments. Such an inability over the next
decade or two would mean the country is insolvent and that foreign banks and governments
would be wiser to try and recover a fraction of the face value of the existing debt rather than
to lend more money. See International Debt and Policy, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Bank-
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 235, 241-243 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings on International Bank Lending].
If the export earnings, after a limited period of two or three years, permit normal debt
servicing, then the country's problem is one of illiquidity and continued foreign lending is
appropriate. If there is a liquidity problem, a halt in lending would be precisely the wrong
thing to do; this would force a country into insolvency and turn a good debt into bad debt. Id.
89. See House Hearings on International Bank Lending, supra note 88, at 15.
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able for those banks which already have considerable loan loss
reserves.9" Uncertainty, coupled with a genuine fear that other banks
may withdraw totally, makes the decision to increase lending a diffi-
cult one. This difficulty is magnified by the possibility that the bank's
competitive position domestically may decrease in comparison to na-
tional competitors who have less exposure overseas or who do not
need to share in the burden of new lending.
There is almost no public encouragement for banks to contrib-
ute new money. Media attention on international lending practices
has exacerbated public perception of the degree of risk involved in
lending to LDCs. As a result, some banks have been publicly criti-
cized for assuming those risks. In light of these facts, some banks
have curtailed lending91 and fewer banks have been willing to con-
tribute new money in addition to old loans. 92 The burden on the re-
maining banks to supply the needed funds has therefore increased.
93
The remaining question is where will the sources of new long
and short term money be found? Official lenders, such as the IMF
and World Bank must provide and guide the use of long-term funds.
Additionally, a majority of the commercial banks with outstanding
loans to LDCs must provide new short-term money, even though
they are under no legal obligation to do so. Secretary Baker has ar-
gued that such financing could be used to meet both short-term fi-
nancing and longer term investment needs in developing countries. If
commercial banks must rely on themselves to raise new money, how-
ever, there may be significant regulatory implications.
90. Id.
91. See supra text accompanying note 32.
92. When the Mexican foreign exchange crisis burst upon the financial world in 1982,
the major United States commercial bank lenders had loans outstanding to Mexico, Brazil and
Argentina totalling 137% of their capital. International Financial Markets and Related
Problems: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess. 381, 386 (1983) (statement of Richard S. Dale, Brooking Institute) [hereinaf-
ter cited as International Financial Markets]. Given that loans to these countries exceeded the
bank's capital, if the loan values on the banks' books were to be written down to actual worth
(or the debtor countries were to repudiate the loans and cause their value to be recognized as
zero) the capital of these banks would be impaired. Id.
93. Secretary Baker has argued that official lenders,.such as the IMF must realize that
their increased participation in sharing the burden is necessary to induce these reluctant banks
to provide new money:
If creditor governments, in an age of budget austerity, are to be called upon
to support increases in multilateral development bank lending to the debtor na-
tions, and if the recipient nations are asked to adopt sound economic policies for
growth to avoid wasting that financing, then there must also be a commitment
by the banking community - a commitment to help the global community
make the necessary transition to stronger growth.
Our assessment of the commitment required by the banks to the entire
group of heavily indebted, middle income developing countries would be net new
lending in the range of $20 billion for the next three years.
See PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH, supra note 10, at V.
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2. Banking Regulation - Prior Regulation.-The Interagency
Country Exposure Review Committee (ICERC) was created in 1979
to implement Congress' statutory directive to evaluate country risk.94
The adoption of this uniform approach to the examination of over-
seas lending marked the first coordinated federal attempt to monitor
foreign lending.9 5 The ICERC was charged with monitoring bank
exposures, evaluating banks' internal systems for managing country
risk, assessing the credit-worthiness of particular countries, identify-
ing problems that could arise because of transfer risk,98 and bringing
these problems to the attention of bank management.
97
The ICERC, however, failed to prevent the escalation of risky
sovereign debt. Banks could ignore the committee classifications
94. "Country risk" is the risk "associated with conditions in the nation where the bor-
rower resides." Walter, Country Risk and International Bank Lending, 1982 U. ILL. L. F. 71.
Such risk may take into account the stability of the government, the country's balance of
payments, and the general health of the economy.
Regarding the ICERC:
IT/he Interagency Country Exposure Review Committee . . . was formed in
1979 and is composed of representatives of the COC [Comptroller of the Cur-
rency], the Fed and the FDIC. It meets three times a year and considers about
20 countries at each meeting, evaluating their current economic situation and
future economic prospects. Judgments made by the Committee are disseminated
to bank examiners for use in evaluating loan portfolios of individual commercial
banking institutions . . . A typical presentation includes a review of the coun-
try's recent economic trends, current economic policies, and projections of the
future direction of the economy, as well as any important structural factors, such
as the quality of natural resources, that should be brought to the Committee's
attention. The focus in these presentations is on the country's current and pro-
spective ability to service its external debt.
House Hearings on International Bank Lending, supra note 88, at 34-35.
95. The supervision and examination of the foreign and domestic activities of United
States banks is divided among three regulatory bodies: the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Comptroller of the Currency (COC).
The FRB is responsible for foreign activities of state member banks and bank holding compa-
nies; the FDIC is responsible for insured state non-member banks and the COC supervises
national banks. THE OPERATIONS OF U.S. BANKS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS:
MINORITY STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 25 (1979).
96. For purposes of this comment, transfer risk means the possibility that an asset can-
not be serviced in a currency of payment because of a lack of or restraints on the availability
of needed foreign exchange in the country of the obligor. 49 Fed. Reg. § 5591 (1984) (to be
codified at § 20.7(d)).
97. International Financial Markets, supra note 92, at 84-89 (statement of Paul
Volcker, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
The ICERC employs a system for categorizing borrower nations according to transfer
risk. See supra note 96. Countries are subject to ICERC classification only when an interrup-
tion in external payment occurs or appears imminent. Based on ICERC review of a nation's
reasons for nonpayment, its prospective sources of financing, and its potential for renewed
debt-servicing, ICERC classifies the nation's loan as substandard, doubtful or loss. Interna-
tional Finance Markets, supra note 92, at 87-88.
In addition to assessing transfer risk, ICERC classifies the debt-serving potential of bor-
rowing nations as strong, middle or weak. When a bank's exposure to a weak country exceeds
10% of its total capital or when exposure to a middle country exceeds 15% of total capital, the
federal bank examiners note the condition in their bank examination report. The purpose of
this is to alert the bank to the situation. No action, however, is required of the bank. Interna-
tional Finance Markets, supra note 92, at 86-87.
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without fear of sanction from the ICERC; market sanctions did not
exist because the classifications were not public.98 The failure of the
ICERC approach has led one commentator to advocate passage of
more binding safeguards to prevent banks from failing as the result
of a single country's default.99
The utilization of more effective tools to encourage bank pru-
dence, however, could lead to political complications. Regulators and
others wishing to solve the international debt crisis must be careful
to engineer improved bank practices without damaging relations
with foreign friendly states or further destabilizing the current debt
situation.
3. The International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 - Cur-
rent Regulation.-The International Lending Supervision Act of
1983 (the Act or ILSA) 00 requires that federal banking agencies 01
impose restrictions on the foreign lending practices of domestic
banks 02 to ensure greater stability of the domestic banking system.
The first major provision of the Act directs "[e]ach appropriate
federal banking agency to require the banking institutions within its
jurisdiction to create special reserves when repayment of foreign
loans becomes questionable."103 The Act's proponents envisioned
that reserves would be needed when a foreign borrower has exhibited
an inability to make payments on its indebtedness over an extended
period of time.104 The Act also compels a lender to create a special
reserve in specifically defined situations in which, "no definite pros-
pects exist for the orderly restoration of debt service."10 5 Congress
98. Although these foreign obligor classifications are not made public, bankers affirm
that since 1983 more foreign states had been downgraded to loan categories. This has en-
couraged bankers to exercise more caution about further lending to such nations. For example,
in March 1984, all loans to Venezuela were downgraded to a "sub-standard" classification. In
November 1984, selective loans to Argentina were also reclassified as "sub-standard" by the
ICERC and by the federal bank regulators. N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1984, at DI, col. 6.
99. The British scholar strongly criticized the ICERC supervisory mechanism and the
reluctance of the regulators to allocate credit. International Financial Markets, supra note 92,
at 388 (statement of Richard S. Dale, Brookings Institute).
100. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1153,
1278 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3901-3912 (1983) [hereinafter cited as ILSA or the Act].
101. See supra note 95.
102. United States policy, as expressed under The International Lending and Supervi-
sion Act, is to restrain the banks in their foreign lending while accommodating the interna-
tional system's need for a continued in-flow of funds to developing countries. This in-flow of
funds is viewed as necessary to avoid the world-wide domino effect that would result if one or
more major countries became unable to pay its external bills.
103. International Lending Supervision Act § 905(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 3904(a)(2) (Supp.
I1 1984). Normal loan loss reserves or allowances for possible loan losses include reserves
which banks maintain for regulatory, supervisory, or disclosure purposes.
104. ILSA § 905(a)(1)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 3904(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 11 1984).
105. Id. The ILSA mandates that banks with particularly high levels of LDC default
exposure establish special reserves against potential losses from foreign loans. Id. Under the
Act, federal banking agencies are to assess the quality of a banking institution's international
loans when determining whether a special loan loss reserve is necessary. Examples of factors to
Spring 1986] PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH
vested in the federal banking agencies the power to define the pa-
rameters of the reserve requirements.10 6
(a) Regulations Promulgated Under the ILSA.-Since the en-
actment of the International Lending Supervision Act, the federal
banking agencies have promulgated international banking require-
ments pursuant to the Act. 07 The regulations issued by the Federal
Reserve Bank (Fed) in conjunction with the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) and Comptroller of the Currency (COC)
govern reserves against potential foreign loan losses, establish inter-
national loan fee accounting conventions, 0 " and require the disclos-
ure and reporting of international assets. 1n9 The new regulations
be considered in making this determination include: 1) failure by the public or private bor-
rower to make full interest payments on external indebtedness; 2) failure to comply with the
terms of any restructured indebtedness; and 3) failure by the foreign country to comply with
any IMF or other stabilization programs. Id.
106. Although Congress vested the power to define the parameters of the reserve re-
quirements in the federal banking agencies, Congress specifically set forth in the Act the ac-
counting treatment for such reserves. Banks are to charge special reserves against their current
income, and are not to include such reserves as part of capital or as part of normal loan loss
reserves. See supra note 103. It is not clear, however, whether the amount banks must hold in
new, separate reserves are fungible with normal reserve funds in covering loan losses not asso-
ciated with foreign lending, or whether banks can use normal loan losses to cover international
loan losses. It can be assumed that the reserves are fungible since the Act limits the use of new
reserves only for regulatory, supervisory or disclosure purposes. See 12 U.S.C. § 3904(a)(2).
107. ILSA § 910(a), 12 U.S.C. § 3909(a) (statutory authority for federal agencies to
issue regulations). The final regulation for all three agencies was issued on Feb. 9, 1984. See
Allocated Transfer Risk Reserve, 49 Fed. Reg. §§ 5590-91 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§§ 20.1, 20.2, 20.7-20.8); id. at §§ 5591-93 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.41-211.43); id.
at § 5593 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 351.1); see also 50 Fed. Reg. § 39980 (1985) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.1-211.7).
108. The regulations enacted by the Fed, the FDIC and the COC, see supra note 104,
were promulgated under the authority of ILSA § 910(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 3909(a)(1). The Act
seeks to "avoid excessive debt burdens on debtor countries" by forbidding banks from charging
any fee exceeding the administrative cost of restructuring "unless the fee is amortized over the
life of the restructured loan." Id. See 49 Fed. Reg. 5594, 5596-99 (1984) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. §§ 20.7, 20.9, 211.42, 211.45, 351.2). Section 910(a)(1) reflects Congressional belief
that additional fees paid to banks for extensions of existing international loans represent an
added interest charge to compensate for the additional credit risks incurred with the resched-
uled principal. Under this philosophy, such fees should therefore be amortized over the effec-
tive life of the loan. See Proposed Solutions to the International Debt Problems: Hearings on
S. 502 and S. 698 Before the Senate Comm. of Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th
Cong., I st Sess. 60 (1983) (statement of C. T. Conover, Comptroller of the Currency) [herein-
after cited as Proposed Solutions].
Banking regulations addressed the fact that front-end fees (fees that are often taken into
income in the period a loan is made, providing a boost to current earnings) are not amortized
and may, as a result, increase a bank's incentive to lend by creating a deceptive short-term
appearance of increased income when the entire fee is added to the bank's current income. Id.
See 49 Fed. Reg. 5594, 5596-99 (1984) (Accounting of International Loan Fees) (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.7, 20.9, 211.42, 211.45, 351.2).
109. These regulations were promulgated under the authority of ILSA § 907, 12 U.S.C.
§ 3906. Section 907 mandates increased disclosure of international lending data. It requires
"each banking institution with foreign country exposure risk to submit" information at least
quarterly about the exposure to the appropriate regulatory agency. Id. at § 3906(a). 49 Fed.
Reg. 5587 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 20.10(a)(l); id. at § 5587 (1984) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.44(a)(1); id. at § 5587 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §
351.3(a)(1)). (Furthermore, banks now are required to make public the figures concerning
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identify the reserves that banks must establish against potential
losses on foreign loans as "Allocated Transfer Risk Reserves"
(ATRRs)." 0 The regulations specify that ATRRs shall represent ten
percent of the principal amount of each international asset for the
first year and fifteen percent in subsequent years unless the federal
banking agencies jointly determine otherwise on a case-by-case ba-
sis.11" ' The new regulations also list the factors that the federal bank-
ing agencies will consider in determining the amount of the ATRR
required for each international asset."'
The special loan loss reserve requirements under the Act and
the ATRR requirements under the regulations provide a significant
economic deterrent to continued LDC lending by domestic banks be-
cause the banks must now deduct new reserve amounts from their
earnings.'1 Since the passage of the Act, major domestic banks have
had to raise their loan loss reserves in response to pressure from fed-
eral banking agency examiners. 4 Increased loan loss reserves have
foreign country exposure in relation to banks assets. Id. at § 3906(b). The chairmen of the
federal banking agencies have stated that public disclosure will allow bank depositors and
investors to scrutinize foreign loans more closely. See Proposed Solutions, supra note 108, at
28 (joint statement of William M. Issac, C.T. Conover and Paul A. Volcker). First, it will
cause banks to make more prudent loans by forcing them to disclose their loans more fre-
quently. Second, depositors and investors will require adequate reserves and greater risk diver-
sification in return for continued and increased investment with the banks. Id.
110. ILSA § 905, 12 U.S.C. 3904 (Supp. 11 1984); 49 Fed. Reg. §§ 5590-5593 (1984)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.8, 211.43, 351.1(b)).
Ill. ILSA § 905(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. 3904(a)(1) (Supp. 1984). The federal banking agen-
cies will jointly determine which foreign assets are subject to reserves and banks will be noti-
fied of the amount of reserves for each of those assets. These reserves are intended to require
banking institutions to recognize uniformly the transfer risk and diminished value of interna-
tional assets which have not been serviced over an extended period of time.
112. 49 Fed. Reg. 5590 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 20.8(a)(b)(i),(ii),(iii); id.
at 5592 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 211.43(a)(b)(i),(ii),(iii); id. at 5593 (1984) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 351.1(b)(1)(2)). The specific amount and timing of the reserve would
vary by country and might also vary by the type of asset. The Fed stated that in determining a
foreign loan reserve amount, the banking agencies would consider: 1) the length of time a
bank's foreign assets were impaired, 2) the actions the debtor took to restore debt service, and
3) the prospects for restoring asset quality and other factors the banking agencies deem rele-
vant. Id. at § 905(a)(1).
113. ILSA § 905(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 3904(a)(2). In some cases, an ATRR may not be a
hinderance to lending. The banking agencies preamble to the final regulations states that, "an
ATRR normally would not be required initially for net new lending when the additional loans
are made in countries implementing economic adjust programs," such as programs approved
by the IMF, designed to correct the countries' economic difficulties in an orderly manner. 49
Fed. Reg. § 5588 (Assets to be covered by the Allocated Transfer Risk Reserve (ATRR)(1))
(1984). The reasoning behind this is that new loans would improve the quality of outstanding
credit, and thus be consistent with the Act's objective of improved supervision of international
lending. See generally ILSA § 901-913, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3912.
114. PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATION TO INCREASE THE RESOURCES OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MONETARY FUND: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
AND MONETARY POLICY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
98th Cong., Ist Sess., 320 (1983) (statement of C.T. Conover, Comptroller of the Currency)
[hereinafter cited as PROPOSALS FOR IMF RESOURCES]. "Some U.S. banks are not realistically
recognizing the value of foreign loans with extended repayment difficulties. Banks should ad-
just the value of the assets, rather than carrying them on their books at full value." Id. at 356-
57. William Isaac, Chairman of the FDIC, also testified that, "[m]any banks have acted
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therefore reduced earnings for most United States multinational
banks." 5
It is likely that faced with both the prospect that lower earnings
are likely because of strict reserve requirements and the realization
that debtor LDCs may remain unable to pay some of their foreign
debt obligations, domestic banks will cut back significantly on their
foreign lending activity." 6 Although one of the goals of the Act is to
safeguard the banking system against aggressive lending to LDCs,
1 7
the Act and the regulations passed under it"' may tend to aggravate
the present debt crisis by curtailing lending vital to LDC solvency.' 9
In order to promote a lasting solution to the international debt crisis,
agency regulatory measures adopted under the Act must help reduce
the current high level of LDC default exposure of domestic banks 2'
and ensure that banks do not exceed prudent levels of foreign default
exposure in the future.'' The regulations, however, must not cause
an LDC credit squeeze so severe as to set LDC economic recovery
back indefinitely.
22
A dominant regulatory concern has been striking an appropriate
balance between reducing domestic bank exposure to potential LDC
default and avoiding an acute undersupply of credit to LDCs, a situ-
ation which could trigger the very risk of LDC default that Congress
sought to prevent. 12 3 For example, reckless bank lending to debtor
nations would cause further deterioration in the quality of a com-
mercial bank's asset portfolio. Such deterioration might cause a run
on the bank's deposits, 2 or, in the event some of the larger debtor
nations default on their borrowing, lead to bank insolvency. 25 On
responsibly and provided specific reserves to reflect foreign loans at a realistic carrying value.
Others have not. When severe and extended problems warrant, banks should specifically re-
serve against certain loans. Id. at 388. Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve
agreed with his colleagues, maintaining that special reserves will indirectly cause greater loan
diversification. See Proposed Solutions, supra note 108, at 29.
115. Behind the Banking Turmoil, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 29, 1984, at 100 (Citicorp reported
a 0.5% decline in third quarter earnings instead of flat earnings for that period because the
bank added $26 million to loan loss reserves).
116. Robatyn, The State of the Banks, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 4, 1982, at 7.
117. See generally ILSA § 901-913, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3912 (Supp. 1984).
118. See supra note 107.
119. See supra text accompanying note 87.
120. See supra notes 25 and 26 and accompanying text.
121. See Cohen, Special Feature, U.S. Regulation of Bank Lending to LDCs: Balancing
Bank Overexposure and Credit Undersupply, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 200 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as U.S. Regulation of Bank Lending to LDCs].
122. Robatyn, Debt-Bomb Threat, TIME, Jan. 10, 1983, at 42 [hereinafter cited as
Robatyn] (possibility of large scale defaults on LDCs).
123. There is a strong possibility that commercial banks making excessive loans to
LDCs could risk financial collapse in the event of LDC default. Id.
124. See Greenspan Warning on Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1983, at D2, Col. 1. Alan
Greenspan, member of the Presidential Council of Economic Advisors under the Nixon and
Ford administrations, warned that depositor concern over the international debt situation
might result in runs on deposits from banks engaged in lending to LDCs. Id.
125. See Top Banks' World Loans Detailed, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 1983, at D3, Col.
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the other hand, a cutback in credit available to debtor nations could
cause financial havoc by forcing debtor nations to default on foreign
debt. 126 Although providing additional credit to finance LDC trade
deficits and interest due on existing debt is not a sound long-term
financing arrangement, the continued availability of credit for LDCs
in the short-run may be essential to forestalling LDC foreign loan
defaults. 12 7 The effectiveness of the Act in promoting greater stabil-
ity in the world financial system will depend upon whether the Act
and subsequent regulations can protect against the twin perils of
LDC credit undersupply and bank overexposure."2 8
(b) Effectiveness of the ILSA and the Regulations Promulgated
Under It.-Initially, the International Lending Supervision Act had
a broad impact and imposed severe restrictions on the banking in-
dustry's foreign lending practices. A closer look at the restrictions
imposed, however, reveals that the Act and the regulations promul-
gated under it may not have solved the perceived problem. In partic-
ular, the congressional language in the Act concerning the policy of
continued extensive cooperation between federal banking agencies
and the IMF 129 may have reduced the effectiveness of the regulatory
program.
The Act provides that the regulatory agencies shall not require
banks to maintain ATRRs for net new lending when additional loans
are made to countries implementing economic adjustment programs
such as those sponsored by the IMF.130 The reasoning behind this
provision was that new loans would improve the quality of outstand-
ing credit and thus be consistent with the Act's objective of improved
supervision of international lending.' 3' Requiring these special
reserves supports the policies set forth under the Act and the regula-
tions by basing the determination of whether a bank has impaired its
assets to a degree necessitating the establishment of special reserves




126. There is concern that dramatic contraction of credit available to LDCs is occurring
as money-center banks seek to reduce exposure to LDC deficit on foreign loans. Continued
lending by private banks is essential in light of projected capital requirements of between $75
billion and $80 billion through 1986. See Robatyn, supra note 122, at 7; See PROGRAM FOR
SUSTAINED GROWTH, supra note 10, at V.
127. See supra text accompanying note 122.
128. See U.S. Regulation of Banking Lending to LDCs, supra note 121, at 225.
129. See infra text accompanying note 133.
130. See supra note 113.
131. EMERGENCY STATEMENT ON EXAMINATION TREATMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LOANS, I FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 2075, at 1971-72 (Dec. 15, 1983).
132. 12 U.S.C. § 3904(a)(1)(A). A potential default may be evidenced in some circum-
stances by the debtor's failure to comply with IMF economic programs.
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Ideally, supporting IMF programs benefits the United States.133
It is important to note that a regulatory scheme that stresses compli-
ance with IMF programs as a factor in determining whether loans
made to foreign countries require special reserves is based on the
assumption that IMF austerity programs 34 are, in the majority of
cases, an assurance of repayment. If this assumption proves to be
incorrect in a significant number of cases, the Act and the regula-
tions might be allowing the external debt of foreign countries to in-
crease without any assurance of repayment. 3
The International Lending Supervision Act is an expression of
Congressional concern for the health of the United States banking
system in light of the LDC debt problem. In the long run, the Act
will probably discourage banks from over-lending to LDCs and im-
prove the financial soundness of those banks by increasing capital
adequacy ratios 3 6 and foreign loss reserves.1 37 There is a potential,
however, that the proposed twenty billion dollars in new commercial-
bank lending to Third World countries will be severely hindered by
certain sections of this Act.' 8
4. Role of Commercial Institutions.-Commercial banks' 39
133. See PROPOSALS FOR IMF RESOURCES, supra note 114, at 308 (statement of Paul
A. Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board). Mr. Volcker stated:
To be sure, some of the IMF advances to borrowing countries, whether or not
the United States is the immediate source of the funds, are likely, directly or
indirectly, to be spent on U.S. exports. Some of the funds may promptly find
their way back into the U.S. banking system or credit markets.
But those technical comparisons should not obscure the basic point of the
IMF commitment. The strengthening of the IMF is an integral part of the over-
all effort to defend the stability of the international financial system. The success
of that effort will not be measured by the amount of dollars drawn, but by its
contribution to confidence that governments can and will work together to assure
that the financial system can and will withstand strains and pressures, continu-
ing to function effectively in the interest of every country.
That concern is not abstract or altruistic. The international financial system
is not separable from our domestic banking and credit system. The same institu-
tions are involved in both markets. A shock to one would be a shock to the other.
In that very real sense, we are not considering esoteric matters of international
finance, or primarily what is in the interest of heavily indebted developing coun-
tries, although that is involved. We are talking about dealing with a threat to the
recovery, the jobs, and the prosperity of our own country, a threat essentially
without parallel in the post-war period.
134. See supra note 19.
135. Cf. Bus. WEEK, Feb. 6, 1984, at 60.
136. The ILSA directs the banking agencies to cause banks to strengthen their capital
bases and to establish minimum capital guidelines for banking institutions. ILSA § 906, 12
U.S.C. § 3907 (Supp. 11 1984). In 1984, under the minimum capital guidelines of the Comp-
troller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board, multinational banking institutions were
required to maintain a primary capital to total assets ratio of at least five%. The Federal
Reserve Board also set specific capital ratio targets for the seventeen largest holding banks.
See 49 Fed. Reg. 30,318 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 208, 225, 263).
137. See supra notes I I 1-12 and accompanying text.
138. 12 U.S.C. § 3904(a)(2), § 3904(a)(I)(A), § 3904(a)(I). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 102-09.
139. For purposes of this section, references to "banks" means commercial lending insti-
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received Mr. Baker's proposal for increased lending with caution and
without enthusiasm. 140 Most commercial banks dread making any
new loans to developing countries where they already have too many
risky loans outstanding. 14  One major reason for this cautiousness on
the part of the banks is that appeals for the relaxation of special
reserve requirements for new loans to LDCs have been rejected by
the federal banking agencies.142 Notwithstanding this hesitancy re-
garding Secretary Baker's proposal, bankers realize that cooperation
with Secretary Baker's concerted approach to the debt situation is
essential. 43
Global economic conditions seem likely to place a significant
constraint on international lending to developing countries immedi-
ately following Secretary Baker's proposal. Commercial banks will
also need to continue to strengthen their own positions. The combi-
nation of these two factors will limit the banks' abilities to provide
significant new loans to developing countries. 144 Nevertheless, a posi-
tive attitude on the part of the banks will demonstrate a readiness to
play a constructive role with other lenders in restoring a prudent and
sustainable flow of finance to credit-worthy borrowers.14
A priority for commercial banks will be to continue to improve
the capital base on which future ability to provide new loans de-
pends. 14 An important aspect of this process is the need for individ-
ual lenders to maintain an adequate level of earnings to make possi-
ble the raising of new resources. 14 7 Banks therefore place particular
importance on the continuing service of interest payments on inter-
national loans.'
48
tutions or multinational banks. See supra note 6.
140. Koepp, Baker Steers a New Course, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 62.
141. In response to this, Secretary Baker stated that if banks participate in his proposal
for increased lending it will be because banks find it in their self-interest. It is possible that
reschedulings and new loans will make bad loans into good loans. See Treasury News supra
note 57, at 5-6.
142. Langley and Zweig, Volcker Rejects Bank Appeals to Relax Reserve Requirement
on Foreign Loans, WALL ST. J., October 22, 1985, at 7, col. 1.
143. Press Conference attended at the Institute of International Finance (11F), October
29, 1985, Washington, D.C. [hereinafter cited as Press Conference Attended]. General sup-
port was expressed for the objective set out in Secretary Baker's proposal of creating condi-
tions conducive to sustained growth in the debtor countries, permitting them to "grow out" of
the debt problem. Sound economic and financial policies in both creditor and debtor countries
are at the heart of any such effort. For a discussion of the IIF see infra text accompanying
note 149.
144. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (statement of Managing Director of
the IIF, Mr. Andre de Lattre).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. The banks recognize that the continued payment of interest from debtor nations is
unlikely. Therefore, in addition to removal of regulatory impediments, banks want creditor
governments to make more trade credits available to debtor nations. This proposal satisfies
Secretary Baker's plan to stimulate growth in debtor nations. However, the overriding theme
of the banks is to "let someone else make the first move." Press Conference Attended, supra
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Banks also intend to continue, through the Institute of Interna-
tional Finance, 49 discussions with borrowing countries for the pur-
pose of improving the flow of information on economic developments
and policies. The banks believe that mutual understanding on the
basis of shared information with borrowers is likely, in the long-run,
to provide the best prospect for a sound relationship between borrow-
ers and lenders. 60
For their part, commercial banks will continue to consider
spreading out the maturity of borrowers' debt once a true commit-
ment to an adjustment strategy is firmly in place.15" ' The banks' suc-
cess, however, will depend largely on the ability of industrialized na-
tions to maintain low and stable inflation rates with correspondingly
stable interest rates. 5 ' In a situation where the perceived risks and
uncertainties attached to international lending are seen to be high
for private lenders, banks are concerned that official creditors also
play an appropriate part. 53
The IMF continues to play a crucial role in supporting adjust-
ment.1 4 In countries where adjustment efforts need to be prolonged,
the IMF should have both adequate resources itself and sufficiently
flexible access limits to allow it to give the LDCs the continuing help
they need.' 5 5 When IMF programs are successfully completed, banks
are concerned that adequate alternative sources of financing be made
available to enable countries to repay the Fund. In particular, they
see an important role for the IDB both in terms of project lending 56
and structural adjustment loans.
57
A durable resolution of the debt problem over the coming years
note 143.
149. In the period since 1982, many individual commercial banks have strengthened
their own positions, particularly by increasing their capital base and by making additional
provisions against loan losses. During this period, the IIF was formed to improve the flow of
information about borrowing countries' prospects and policies. See Press Conference Attended,
supra note 143 (Background Note prepared by IIF staff).
150. Id.
151. See supra note 79.
152. Industrial countries need to direct their best efforts towards the adoption of mea-
sures leading to an immediate reduction in interest rates or international markets. See Interna-
tional Debt Problems, supra note 27, at 67 (statement of Richard E. Feinberg, Vice President,
Overseas Development Council). A decline in interest rates would immediately reduce the cap-
ital outflow. However, if the balance-of-payments outlook for the important debtor nations
does not improve, or if interest rates go much higher, pressures will mount for more action on
the negative side of the capital flow equation. Id.
The major debtors are already pressing for lower interest rates. The banks have been
willing to reduce some of their fees, but they tend to resist such concessions as a "cap" on
interest rates, especially if payments above a cap are cancelled. Banks would probably object
less to the postponing or capitalization of some interest payments, provided regulators relaxed
penalties for doing so. Id.
153. See supra text accompanying note 133.
154. See supra text accompanying note I3'3.
155. See supra notes 18-20.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
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will require primarily sound economic policies in the borrowing
countries.158 Only in this way can developing countries attract an
adequate supply of finance on acceptable terms. During the transi-
tion period close cooperation between sovereign borrowers, interna-
tional financial institutions and commercial banks will be required.1"
C. Actions Required of the LDCs and Creditor Nations - The
First Prong
1. Actions to be taken by the LDCs.-Under Secretary
Baker's proposal, the essential element to a successful resolution of
the LDC debt crisis is increased participation by debtor countries.
This aspect of Mr. Baker's proposal is the most speculative.160 A real
resolution can occur only if the developing countries adopt proper
economic policies that promote economic efficiency, competitiveness,
and productivity."" Sound policies in the principal debtor countries
will not only promote growth, but will also stimulate the needed pri-
vate lending.1 62 These policies must be supported by the IMF and
complemented by the multinational development banks.' 63 These in-
stitutions can help encourage and catalyze both needed policies and
financing.1 64 Efforts by any country to "go it alone" are likely to
seriously damage its prospects for future growth. 16 5
2. Trade liberalization by creditor nations.-LDC coopera-
tion at the domestic level with plans and policies proposed under
Secretary Baker's Program for Sustained Growth is not enough to
ensure economic rehabilitation. Creditor nations must also cooperate
by liberalizing their trade policies. Trade liberalization would pro-
mote LDC exports and thus spur local economies into generating the
158. There is a close relationship between debt problems, financing and trade in the
strength of a region's payment capacity. Economic growth will be stimulated through in-
creased exports, renewed flow of financing, and the maintenance of import capacities at appro-
priate levels. International Debt Problem, supra note 27, at 65 (statement of Richard E. Fein-
berg, Vice President, Overseas Development Council).
159. PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH, supra note 10, at VII.
160. This aspect deals with the human element - a total nation - as opposed to regu-
lated lending institutions, the IMF, and the World Bank. The success of this plan depends on
the actions and behavior of a total nation and not just one particular part of that nation. If
these debtor nations choose not to comply with Secretary Baker's proposal, all efforts by other
participants in this process will be worthless.
161.
Countries which are not prepared to undertake basic adjustments and work
within the framework of the case-by-case debt strategy cooperating with the in-
ternational financial institutions, cannot expect to benefit from this proposed pro-
gram. Additional lending will not occur.
PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH, supra note 10, at II.
162. See supra text accompanying note 151.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 79-8 1.
165. "In today's highly interdependent world economy, efforts at economic isolationism
are doomed to failure." PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH, supra note 10, at II.
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funds necessary for the repayment of foreign debt.
Currently the preeminent international rules regulating trade
are those embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). 6 The GATT originally was intended only to govern recip-
rocal tariff reductions. 16 7 The general principals of conduct con-
tained in the GATT regarding nontariff barriers were intended to
ensure, in conjunction with the establishment of an International
Trade Organization (ITO), 68 the effectiveness of the tariff conces-
sions negotiated under the protection of the GATT."6 8 When the
ITO failed to become a reality, the obligations in the GATT became
the principal legal framework for world trade.
1 7
1
With the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the oil
crisis in 1973, and the onset of the world-wide recession in developed
countries in 1974, the previously liberal international trade environ-
ment turned sour. Thus, the need for international trade reform was
great, however, the legal economic context was unfavorable to such
reform.17 1 Even so, according to the Multilateral Trade Negotiation
(MTN) of September 1973,172 the GATT negotiations still had two
goals: first, to expand and liberalize world trade and second, to im-
prove the trading strength of the developing countries. 73 These goals
166. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT).
167. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND LAW OF GAIT 32-58 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as JACKSON].
168. The initial formation of the GATTr focused on the formation of an International
Trade Organization. After a series of international conferences the Final Act of the ITO Char-
ter (Havana Charter) was signed in Havana in March 1948. KOUL, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
OF UNCTAD IN WORLD TRADE 19-21 (1977).
169. These general principles of conduct on nontariff barriers, were not, however, strictly
tied to each agreement on particular tariff concessions. Rather, these principles were intended
to have general applicability to all products. JACKSON, supra note 167, at 35-58.
170. For a thorough discussion of the development of and relationship between the ITO
and GATT, and the failure of the ITO to materialize, see id.
171. Additionally, relatively high unemployment rates, stagnant economic growth and
further shifts of comparative advantage in favor of developing countries contributed to the
emergence of protectionist pressures in developed countries. Balassa, The "New Protection-
ism" and the International Economy, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 409 (1978).
172. The Multilateral Trade Negotiation (MTN) is often called the "Tokyo Round"
because it was launched in Tokyo in 1973. The agreements resulting from the Tokyo Round
were completed in 1979. See AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., ist Sess., pt. 1 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as MTA]. Ministers from developed and some developing countries initialed the
MTA in Geneva on April 12, 1979. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in
[1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, pt. 6A, at 3, 12.
173.
The negotiations shall aim to: 1) Achieve the expansion of ever-greater liberali-
zation of world trade and improvement in the standard of living and welfare of
the people of the world .. .inter alia, through the progressive dismantling of
the international framework for the conduct of world trade. 2) Secure additional
benefits for the international trade of developing countries so as to achieve a
substantial increase in their foreign exchange earnings, the diversification of
their exports, the acceleration of the rate of growth of their trade ... and a
better balance between developing and developed countries in the sharing of the
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were embodied in what has come to be known as the Tokyo Declara-
tion. 1 7  Since this 1974 Tokyo Declaration, commentators in the in-
ternational development field have urged that with a continuing ef-
fort, successful management of the debt problem can continue so
long as certain fundamentals are respected. By persistent and effec-
tive adjustment efforts and continued growth among the industrial
countries as a whole, LDCs will be able to competitively promote
their products in the world market. 5 This goal, however, will rest
largely upon LDCs keeping inflation and budgetary deficits down.
176
The developing countries traditionally demanded that industri-
ally advanced countries grant tariff preferences on manufactured
goods and semi-manufactured goods imported from poorer countries.
Tariff preferences could effectively expand the export earnings and
promote the industrialization of the LDCs. LDCs argue that prefer-
ential entry to developed-country markets would enable them to ex-
pand their exports of manufactured goods and allow them to com-
pete with the goods of the developed countries. 7
Developed countries have unwillingly granted preferences, but
have limited their effectiveness through the use of exemptions, tariff
quotas, and "market disruption" escape clauses.178 Although prefer-
ences may have symbolic value from the standpoint of international
equity, the less developed countries have begun to realize that other
forms of trade liberalization would prove beneficial in increasing
their foreign exchange earnings and promoting exports.179
advantages resulting from this expansion ....
DECLARATION OF MINISTERS approved at Tokyo on 14 September 1973, para. 1, reprinted in
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DoCu-
MENTS (20th Supp.) 19, 19-20 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tokyo Declaration].
174. Id.
175. International Debt Problems, supra note 27, at 115-16 (statement of Chairman
Fascell).
176. Id.
177. To illustrate the effects of tariff preferences, assume that developed country A im-
ports shoes from both B, another developed country and from C, a developing country. Devel-
oped country B's export price is 100 compared with developing country C's export price of
120. If country A initially imposes a 50% value on all imported shoes, the import price plus
duty of B's and C's shoes are 150 and 180 respectively. In this situation, country A clearly
chooses to import from the other developed country B.
Suppose, however, that A retains the 50% value on B's exports while levying no duty on
developing country C's exports (a 100% preferential margin). Country C's exported shoes will
now be competitive in country A at a price up to 150 (price plus duty of imports from B).
Prior to granting the preference, A paid customs receipts of 50 (the duty imposed on imports
from developed country B) to itself. By granting such preferences, therefore, developed country
A will not import shoes from developing country C, resulting in a transfer of real resources to
C in an amount equal to the foregone customs revenue. A. KRUEGER, LIBERALIZATION AT-
TEMPTS AND CONSEQUENCES (National Bureau of Economic Research 1978).
178. See infra text accompanying note 181.
179. Prior to the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, one study of market
access revealed that overall, the most restricted products are those whose export the developing
countries could most easily expand. See generally H. LYDALL. TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT: A
STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF TRADE EXPANSION ON EMPLOYMENT IN DEVELOPED AND DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES (1975). Moreover, the most heavily protected products in the developed
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The post-1973 era, however, has been characterized by a steady
increase in protectionist trade measures. 180 Under the guise of
preventing "market disruption"'18 nations have imposed numerous
quantitative restrictions in the form of Orderly Market Agreements
(OMAs) 182 and Voluntary Exports Restraints (VERs).' 83 In addi-
tion, the number of unreported government-to-government and in-
dustry-to-industry "understandings" to limit exports to a "reasonable
level" may greatly exceed the number of OMAs and VERs. The
LDCs fear that developed countries will continue imposing trade re-
strictions in the form of quotas, OMAs, and VERs to limit new de-
veloping country exports.
The LDCs' need for export revenue became great'84 since the
post-1973 increase in oil prices caused great disparity in the balance
of payments of non-oil producing developing countries. But because
increased oil prices significantly depleted the buying power of oil-
importing developed countries, the transfer of resources from the
richer countries to the poorer non-oil producing nations has
countries tend to be those whose impact would be most responsive to a trade liberalization
policy. Id. at 19. Examples of exports of special importance to developing countries include
textile, clothing, footwear and certain food products. Id. These manufactured and semi-manu-
factured goods are especially attractive to developing nations because they lend themselves to
labor-intensive production on a small or medium scale based on a local supply of natural re-
sources. Id.
180. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
181. Foreign imports may prove to have more of an impact on local economies in devel-
oped nations than first suspected. For example, if there have been layoffs in the industry, and a
company or its hometown have been hit hard, it may be appropriate to look at imports as the
potential cause. These problems can be remedied, however, by very specific forms of relief. The
Trade Act of 1974, for example, provides for a limit on imports only to those areas where
American workers, firms and communities have been injured by increased imports. Trade Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1106(d)(1) 93 Stat. 1979, 312 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §
2253(a)(4) (1976 and Supp. IV 1980).
182. An "Orderly Market Agreement" is merely a bilateral restraint agreement. How-
ever, the definition of such agreements may vary according to the international agreement in
which it is used. For instance, the Trade Act of 1974, defines only OMAs as "orderly market
agreements with foreign countries limiting the export from foreign countries and the import
into the United States... " Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 96-39 § I106(d)(l), 93 Stat.,
1979, 312 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(4) (1976) & Supp. IV 1980). OMAs are treated
in the 1974 Trade Act as an official import relief measure, along with unilateral quantitative
import restrictions. Id. at §§ 2253(b)-(k) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). OMAs are unusually im-
plemented by a government explicitly and formally in light of specific agreements negotiated
between exporting and importing countries. See UNCTAD, GROWING PROTECTIONISM AND
THE STANDSTILL ON TRADE BARRIER AGAINST IMPORTS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 9
U.N. Doc. TD/B/C2/194 (1978) [hereinafter cited as UNCTAD].
. 183. "Voluntary Export Restraints" are also bilateral restraint agreements. See supra
note 182. VERs occur essentially as a result of bilateral negotiations between industries
(rather than governments) in importing and exporting countries. They must, however, have the
support of their governments. Implementation is left to the industry in the exporting country.
See UNCTAD, supra note 182, at 5. Textile quotas are an excellent example of VERs.
184. Against a background of restrictive trade policies, representatives of developing
countries stress the need for trade liberalization. Liberalization, they feel, will permit the
poorer countries to fully develop their export potential in low-cost manufactured goods. United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Comprehensive, Measures Re-
quired to Expand and Diversify the Export Trade of Developing Countries in Manufacturers
and Semi-Manufacturers, U.N. Doc. TD/230 & Supp. 1 (1979) at 1.
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declined. 185
As early as 1947, in the initial negotiations for the International
Trade Organization, representatives of the less developed countries
wanted to grant to the ITO "wide authority for all waiver of dis-
criminatory practices, if these were intended to foster economic de-
velopment."' 86 When the ITO did not absorb the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),' 8 7 the "Economic Development
and Reconstruction" chapter of the Havana Charter became
moot. 188 The fundamental concept contained in the Charter that dif-
ferent developing countries should receive special treatment accord-
ing to their different stages of economic development, however, has
persisted. This concept raises, in turn, the ultimate question of
whether new efforts are necessary to effectively integrate the activi-
ties of the GATT, the International Monetary Fund, and the World
Bank. 89
Since the disintegration of the Bretton Woods System, 90 inter-
national monetary affairs have taken a course of "abandonment."
The IMF lost its control over borrowing nations' conduct when these
nations adopted floating exchange rates.19' The GATT's role is in-
separable from those of the IMF and World Bank, however, during
this period of abandonment, these three have remained separate in-
stitutions, with only minimal consultation among them. In order to
liberalize trade and foster development in the developing countries
through trade, the IMF, the World Bank and the GATT must work
more closely together. 92 In order to liberalize trade and foster devel-
185. Deteriorating economic conditions in the developed countries since the beginning of
the Tokyo Round hinder the task of liberalization. Stagflation has intensified concern over
unemployment, and hence the need to protect "domestic jobs from competitive low cost imports.
Id.
186. G. PATTERSON, DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE POLICY ISSUE
(1945-1965), 323 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PATTERSON].
187. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 170 and text accompanying notes 169-70.
189. PATTERSON, supra note 189, at 324.
190. See supra note 11.
191. See supra note 27.
192.
The growth of protectionism is a concern to the IMF in relation to the adjust-
ment problems of developing countries. Trade restrictions are major impedi-
ments to the process of global adjustment because they obstruct the exchange of
goods on the basis of comparative costs and retard needed structural change in
the domestic economies of countries imposing them. Because of the severe exter-
nal constraints facing many of the developing countries, the possibility of achiev-
ing significant reductions in trade restrictions will depend on the leadership pro-
vided by the industrial countries. In this connection, the undertaking of the
GATT at its meeting in 1982 "to resist protectionist pressures in the formulation
and implementation of national trade policy and in proposing legislation" and
"to avoid measures which would limit or distort international trade "is to be
welcomed." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Press Release No. 1328
(Geneva), No. 29, 1982 at 3-4.
It now remains to translate these intentions into concrete policy actions so
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opment in the developing countries through trade, the IMF, the
World Bank, and the GATT must work more closely together.19
IV. Conclusion
A developing country's inability to service its debt could precipi-
tate bank crises in many developed countries including the United
States. At a minimum such events could eliminate the reserves of
any major commercial bank with a high degree of international ex-
posure, thus significantly reducing the shareholders' equity in those
banks. More dramatically, a default by one LDC could create a
domino effect, leading other nations to default on their external
debts. The resulting avalanche of defaults could cause several banks
to fail, setting off stock market crashes and ultimately leading to a
world-wide depression.
Secretary Baker's "Program for Sustained Growth" can prevent
this imminent world-wide catastrophe. By coordinating the efforts of
the IMF, the World Bank, commercial banks, and the LDCs, the
Program would catalyze commercial global growth. The success of
the Program depends, however, on the cooperation of all the parties.
The principal debtor nations must first make policy decisions to
restructure their economies.1 94 Second, commercial banks must pro-
vide adequate resources to support these efforts. 95 Third, the IMF
and the World Bank must promote these efforts through national
programs for growth which in turn will generate confidence in the
LDC economies.' 9 This additional confidence in the LDC economies
will in turn help to maintain a flow of private capital into those
countries.
Cooperation is the key. Without it the world will continue to
live with the increasingly likely possibility of a major depression.
With it, positive steps can be taken pursuant to Secretary Baker's
Program to improve the economies and credit ratings of the various
debtor LDCs and avoid a world-wide economic catastrophe.
Nancy A. Aliquo
as to resume progress toward an open multilateral trading environment, which is
in the interest of both developed and developing countries.
IMF ANNUAL REPORT 63-64 (1983).
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A. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE
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SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
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Chairman TourE, Managing Director de Larosiere, President
Clausen, fellow Governors, and distinguished guests:
It is a pleasure to be here for the 40th annual meeting of the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Strong, effective
international financial institutions are as essential to our economic
well being today as they were 40 years ago.
Our host country, Korea, is a nation whose economic success is
surpassed only by its warm hospitality. Korea's market-oriented ap-
proach and strong emphasis on private initiative are a lesson for us
all.
I. Foundation for Growth
I would like to focus my comments today on policies for growth
within the context of the international debt strategy. Sound polices
and sustained, low-inflation growth in the industrial countries must
provide the essential foundation for a successful debt stratagy, and
are a prerequisite for stronger growth in the debtor countries.
The major industrial countries have already made considerable
progress in this direction. Two weeks ago in New York the Finance
Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the Group of Five indus-
trial nations underscored the progress which had been achieved, par-
ticularly with regard to the convergence of economic performance
toward sustained, low-inflation growth. They also announced a set of
policy intentions that will help to consolidate and extend that pro-
gress and to improve and sustain growth for the longer term.
We emphasized, for our own countries, the central importance
of reducing structural rigidities, strengthening incentives for the pri-
vate sector, reducing the size of government, and improving the in-
vestment environment. We also rededicated our governments to re-
sisting protectionist pressures that threaten our own prosperity and
the opportunities for others. We must jointly accelerate our efforts to
launch a new round of trade negotiations within the GATT.
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These industrial nations agreed that the significant progress al-
ready achieved in promoting a better convergence of their economic
performance had not been fully reflected in exchange markets and
that some further orderly appreciation of the main non-dollar cur-
rencies against the dollar was desirable. We expressed our willing-
ness to cooperate more closely to encourage this when to do so would
be helpful.
This package of measures had an immediate, significant impact
on exchange markets which continues to be positive, and reflects the
importance of the commitments made.
I am convinced that if each of the major industrial nations ful-
fills its policy intentions and maintains or improves access to its mar-
kets, we will have taken a major step toward more balanced and
sustainable growth, while providing a solid framework for improving
the debt situation in the developing world.
II. Strengthening the Debt Strategy
Fellow Governors, it is essential that we begin the process of
strengthening our international debt strategy.
Three years ago the international financial community devel-
oped a flexible, cooperative, case-by-case strategy to address the debt
problem and lay the basis for growth in the debtor nations. In three
years:
- Aggregate current account deficits in developing countries
have been sharply reduced from from $104 billion in 1982 to
$44 billion this year.
- Growth in developing countries has been restored to about 4
percent, compared to less than 2 percent in 1982.
- This growth has been fueled by sharp increases in developing
nations' exports, including a 21 percent increase in their ex-
ports to the United States last year.
These developments reflect improved growth and sharply lower
interest rates in the industrial nations, as well as adoption of im-
proved policies within most debtor countries. These policies have
been given important support by reschedulings and rollovers amount-
ing to approximately $210 billion, and by net new commercial bank
lending.
The international financial institutions have also played an im-
portant role in the progress that has been achieved. The IMF in par-
ticular has very capably played a leadership role, providing guidance
on policies and temporary balance of payments financing, both of
which have catalyzed commercial bank flows.
Despite this progress, some serious problems have developed. A
number of principal debtor countries have recently experienced set-
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backs in their efforts to improve their economic situations, particu-
larly with regard to inflation and fiscal imbalances, undercutting
prospects for sustained growth. Bank lending to debtor nations has
been declining, with very little net new lending anticipated this year.
The sense of increasing reluctance among banks to participate in
new money and debt rescheduling packages has introduced serious
uncertainties for borrowers, in some cases making it more difficult
for them to pursue economic reforms.
These problems need to be addressed, promptly and effectively,
by building upon the international debt strategy in order to improve
the prospects for growth in the debtor countries. This is an enterprise
which will require, above all, that we work together and that we
each strengthen our commitment to progress.
If the debt problem is to be solved, there must be a "Program
for Sustained Growth", incorporating three essential and mutually
reinforcing elements:
" First and foremost, the adoption by principal debtor countries
of comprehensive macroeconomic and structural policies, sup-
ported by the international financial institutions, to promote
growth and balance of payments adjustment, and to reduce
inflation.
" Second, a continued central role for the IMF, in conjunction
with increased and more effective structural adjustment lend-
ing by the multilateral development banks (MDBs), both in
support of the adoption by principal debtors of market-ori-
ented polices for growth.
" Third, increased lending by the private banks in support of
comprehensive economic adjustment programs.
I want to emphasize that the United States does not support a
departure from the case-by-case debt strategy we adopted three
years ago. This approach has served us well; we should continue to
follow it. It recognizes the inescapable fact that the particular cir-
cumstances of each country are different. Its main components, fun-
damental adjustment measures within the debtor nations and condi-
tionality in conjunction with lending, remain essential to the
restoration of external balance and longer-term growth.
We. need to build upon the current strategy to strengthen its
ability to foster growth. There must be greater emphasis on both
market-oriented economic policies to foster growth and adequate fi-
nancing to support it.
In essence, what I am suggesting is that adequate financing can
be made available through a combination of private creditors and
multilateral institutions working cooperatively, but only where there
are reasonable prospects that growth will occur. This will depend
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upon the adoption of proper economic policies by the developing
countries. Financing can only be prudently made available when and
as effective policies to promote economic efficiency, competitiveness
and productivity - the true foundations of growth - are put in
place. We cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of the past. Adjust-
ment must continue. Adjustment programs must be agreed before
additional funds are made available, and should be implemented as
those funds are disbursed.
These efforts should be mutually reinforcing. Sound policies in
the principal debtor countries will not only promote growth, but will
also stimulate the needed private bank lending. And it will be impor-
tant that these policies be supported by the IMF, complemented by
the MDBs. These institutions can help encourage and catalyze both
needed policies and financing.
In today's highly interdependent world economy, efforts at eco-
nomic isolationism are doomed to failure. Countries which are not
prepared to undertake basic adjustments and work within the frame-
work of the case-by-case debt strategy, cooperating with the interna-
tional financial institutions, cannot expect to benefit from this three-
point program. Additional lending will not occur. Efforts by any
country to "go it alone" are likely to seriously damage its prospects
for future growth.
I would like to elaborate on the actions that will be required by
each participant in this three-point program.
III. Structural Change in the Principal Debtors
The essence of the need for structural change in the principal
debtors is captured in two quotations I would like to share with you.
First:
"The only way to overcome our economic crisis is to tackle at
their root the structural problems of our economy to make it
more efficient and productive."'
And second:
"Economic growth will have solid foundations only if we reest-
ablish trust and stimulate private enterprise, which must be the
flagship of our economic development. . . We will promote au-
thentic institutional change in the economic sector."'
These are not the words of a U.S. Secretary of the Treasury.
They are statements made in July of this year by the Presidents of
Mexico and Brazil. I believe they reflect a growing sentiment in
President de la Madrid at Mexican Bankers Association Annual Meeting, July 22,
1985.
2 President Sarney in a televised address to the nation, July 23, 1985.
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Latin America.
It is essential that the heavily indebted, middle income develop-
ing countries do their part to implement and maintain sound policies.
Indeed, without such policies, needed financing cannot be expected
to materialize. Policy and financing are not substitutes but essential
complements.
For those countries which have implemented measures to ad-
dress the imbalances in their economies, a more comprehensive set of
policies can now be put in place, which promises longer term benefits
from stronger growth, higher standards of living, lower inflations,
and more flexible and productive economies. These must not only
include macroeconomic policies, but also other medium and longer
term supply-side policies to promote growth.
We believe that such institutional and structural policies should
include:
- increased reliance on the private sector, and less reliance on
government, to help increase employment, production and
efficiency;
- supply-side actions to mobilize domestic savings and facili-
tate efficient investment, both domestic and foreign, by
means of tax reform, labor market reform and development
of financial markets; and
- market-opening measures to encourage foreign direct invest-
ment and capital inflows, as well as to liberalize trade, in-
cluding the reduction of export subsidies.
This broader approach does not mean that policy areas that
have been the focus of efforts to date - in particular fiscal, mone-
tary, and exchange rate policies - can receive less attention. Indeed,
macroeconomic policies have been central to efforts to date and must
be strengthened to achieve greater progress. These policies should
consist of:
- market-oriented exchange rate, interest rate, wage and pric-
ing policies to promote greater economic efficiency and re-
sponsiveness to growth and employment opportunities; and
- sound monetary and fiscal policies focused on reducing do-
mestic imbalances and inflation and on freeing up resources
for the private sector.
The cornerstone of sustained growth must be greater domestic
savings, and investment of those savings at home. Macroeconomic
and structural policies which improve economic efficiency, mobilize
domestic resources, and provide incentives to work, save, and invest
domestically will create the favorable economic environment neces-
sary for this to occur. Such an environment is also critical to attract
supplemental foreign savings.
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As a practical matter, it is unrealistic to call upon the support
of voluntary lending from abroad, whether public or private, when
domestic funds are moving in the other direction. Capital flight must
be reversed if there is to be any real prospect of additional funding,
whether debt or equity. If a country's own citizens have no confi-
dence in its economic system, how can others?
There are essentially two kinds of capital inflows: loans and eq-
uity investments. Foreign borrowings have to be repaid - with in-
terest. Equity investment, on the other hand, has a degree of perma-
nence and is not debt-creating. Moreover, it can have a compounding
effect on growth, bring innovation and technology, and help to keep
capital at home.
We believe that the debtor nations must be willing to commit
themselves to these policies for growth in order that the other ele-
ments of a strengthened debt strategy can come into place.
IV. Enhanced Effectiveness of the International Financial
Institutions
The international financial institutions must also play an impor-
tant role in strengthening the debt strategy to promote growth. How-
ever, we must recognize that the international financial institutions
cannot have sufficient resources to meet the debtor nations' financing
needs all by themselves. An approach which assumes that the IMF
and the World Bank are the sole answer to debt problems is simply a
non-starter. For most developing countries other sources must play a
more important role. These include private sector borrowing, in-
creased export earnings, foreign equity investment, and repatriation
of capital which has fled abroad. All these routes should be pursued.
Among the international financial institutions, the IMF has
played a major role in advising member nations on the development
of policies necessary to promote adjustment and growth. There has
been a particular focus on monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate poli-
cies, although increasing attention is being paid to other areas such
as trade liberalization, pricing policies, and the efficiency of govern-
ment-owned enterprises.
Emphasizing growth does not mean deemphasizing the IMF.
Through both its policy advice and balance of payments financing,
the Fund has played a critical role in encouraging needed policy
changes and catalyzing capital flows. It must continue to do so. But
it must also develop new techniques for catalyzing financing in sup-
port of further progress. "Enhanced surveillance," for example, can
sometimes provide an effective means of continued IMF involvement.
The Fund should give higher priority to tax reform, market-ori-
ented pricing, the reduction of labor market rigidities, and to open-
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ing economies to foreign trade and investment. This will help assure
that Fund-supported programs are growth-oriented. It will be partic-
ularly important for the Fund to work closely with the World Bank
in this effort.
I would now like to turn more directly to the role of the MDBs,
which need to be brought into the debt strategy in a stronger way,
without diminishing the role still to be played by the IMF.
The World Bank, and indeed all MDBs, have considerable
scope to build on current programs and resources, and to provide
additional assistance to debtor nations which is disbursed more
quickly and targeted more effectively to provide the needed stimulus
to growth.
There is ample room to expand the World Bank's fast-disburs-
ing lending to support growth-oriented policies, and institutional and
sectoral reform. An increase in such lending can serve as a catalyst
for commercial bank lending.
A serious effort to develop the programs of the World Bank and
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) could increase their
disbursements to principal debtors by roughly 50 percent from the
current annual level of nearly $6 billion.
Increased disbursements would require greater borrowing by the
MDBs in world capital markets. Their ability to borrow at low rates
is a precious asset which must be preserved. Therefore, their lending
must be in support of sound economic programs that enhance the
borrower's ability to service its debt and grow.
It should be possible, with a concerted effort by both the World
Bank and borrowers, to streamline World Bank operations in order
to reduce considerably the time period required to formulate and im-
plement such assistance programs. This will expedite the actual dis-
bursement of funds.
The value and role of an indigenous, competitive private sector
needs to be recognized and developed more fully than it has in the
past. The Bank, for its part, should actively promote the develop-
ment of the private sector and, where appropriate, provide direct as-
sistance to this sector. In addition, the Bank should seek to assist,
both in a technical and financial capacity, those countries wish to
"privatize" their state-owned enterprises, which in too many cases
aggravate already serious budget deficit problems.
Given the importance of increasing commercial bank flows to
the principal debtors, there is also an urgent need for efforts to ex-
pand the Bank's co-financing operations. These efforts should be pur-
sued vigorously to increase the effectiveness of the Bank in helping
its borrowers to attract private finance, and should have substantial
potential in the context of this three-point program.
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The enhanced program of the International Finance Corpora-
tion, wth an expanded capital base, and the recently negotiated Mul-
tilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) are two important
Bank Group initiatives in support of developing countries. Both orga-
nizations can do much to assist their members in attracting non-debt
capital flows as well as critical technological and managerial re-
sources. We urge all Bank Members and particularly the principal
debtors to give their full support to establishment of the MIGA.
If developing countries implement growth-oriented reform; if
commercial banks provide adequate increases in net new lending to
good performers; and if increased demand for quality IBRD lending
demonstrates the need for increased capital resources, we would be
prepared to look seriously at the timing and scope of a general capi-
tal increase.
We believe the World Bank's efforts can be supplemented ac-
tively by the regional development banks. Since some of the most
serious debt problems are found in Latin America, special emphasis
should be placed on strengthening the IDB's policies to enable it to
be a more effective partner in support of growth-oriented structural
reform.
In the case of an IDB capital increase, it will be critical to as-
sess the extent to which the institution strengthens its lending poli-
cies. There must be well-defined economic and country strategies tai-
lored to enhance economic reforms which encourage growth. Given a
firm commitment by the IDB to move in this direction, we believe
that it should be permitted to introduce a major program of well
targeted non-project lending. In the meantime, such lending could be
associated with World Bank programs until the IDB has imple-
mented te necessary reforms.
V. Increasing Lending by the International Banking Community
The international banking community has played an important
role during the past three years. I am, however, concerned about the
decline in net bank lending to debtor nations over the past year and
a half, particularly those nations which are making progress. All of
us can appreciate the commercial banks' concerns, but we believe
these concerns would dissipate if the banks were confident that new
lending is in support of policies for growth in the developing nations.
If creditor governments, in an age of budget austerity, are to be
called upon to support increases in multilateral development bank
lending to the debtor nations, and if the recipient nations are asked
to adopt sound economic policies for growth to avoid wasting that
financing, then there must also be a commitment by the banking
community - a commitment to help the global community make
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the necessary transition to stronger growth.
Our assessment of the commitment required by the banks to the
entire group of heavily indebted, middle income developing countries
would be net new lending in the range of $20 billion for the next
three years. In addition, it would be necessary that countries now
receiving adequate financing from banks on a voluntary basis con-
tinue to do so, provided they maintain sound policies.
I would like to see the banking community make a pledge to
provide these amounts of new lending and make it publicly, provided
the debtor countries also make similar growth-oriented policy com-
mitments as their part of the cooperative effort. Such financing could
be used to meet both short-term financing and longer-term invest-
ment needs in the developing countries, and would be available, pro-
vided debtors took action and multilateral institutions also did their
part.
We would welcome suggestions from the banking community
about arrangements which could be developed in order to ensure that
adequate financing to support growth is available.
VI. The Poorest Countries
Before concluding my statement, I would like to focus briefly on
the problems of another set of debtor countries, the low-income debt-
ors with protracted balance of payments problems. Special efforts
are being made to assist these countries, but more can and should be
done to improve their longer-term prospects.
The United States believes that the resources provided by the
Trust Fund reflows provide a unique opportunity to help address the
economic problems of the poorest countries with protracted balance
of payments difficulties. Recent experience demonstrates that succes-
ful resolution of the economic problems of these countries requires a
comprehensive approach, including fundamental structural policy
changes, as well as sound macroeconomic policies.
The $2.7 billion in Trust Fund reflows present us with an oppor-
tunity to utilize IMF resources, possibly supplemented by funds from
other sources, in support of such comprehensive economic programs.
The effectiveness of such programs would be enhanced by close co-
operation between the Fund and Bank. In some cases, this could best
be accomplished by a joint approach by the two institutions in sup-
port of comprehensive programs.
The United States is also prepared to consider a bolder ap-
proach, involving more intensive IMF and World Bank collabora-
tion. We believe that this approach would help ensure that the insti-
tutions provide sound, mutually consistent advice on the full range of
policies to promote growth.
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The United States, which supported African countries with $1.7
billion in bilateral aid in 1985, would be prepared to consider seek-
ing resources in support of such a far-reaching approach if other do-
nors were prepared to make equitable contributions.
We recognize that some may have reservations about such an
approach, viewing it as complicated and difficult to implement. I can
understand some of those concerns, and believe they suggest the
need for further reflection on certain aspects of this proposal. But,
we cannot let parochial resistance or unfounded suspicions block an
idea that can significantly help the poorest countries and strengthen
ties between the Fund and the Bank. I urge you to give this ap-
proach further consideration during the months ahead.
VII. Conclusion
In conclusion, much has been accomplished in the past few
years in addressing the pressing economic problems of the early
1980s and preparing the foundation for future global growth. We
must now join together to consolidate our progress in building
stronger economies for the future.
Sound policies and growth in the industrial world can provide a
solid foundation for strengthening and adapting the current interna-
tional debt strategy. Let us not lose the present opportunity. I have
proposed a three-point "Program for Sustained Growth" to provide
renewed impetus for -resolving the debt problem. We must not
deceive ourselves. There are no easy solutions, and none of us can
escape our responsibilities.
The principal debtor nations must make the hard policy deci-
sions to restructure their economies. The commercial banks must
provide adequate resources to support these efforts. The MDBs must
increase the efficiency and volume of their lending.
Moving from proposal to implementation will be a demanding
exercise and cannot be accomplished overnight. As we, adapt our
strategy, we must continue to look to the. IMF as the catalyst for
new financial flows. And with these new flows will come new hope.
We will be building on the efforts of the past. The needs are
clearly recognized by borrowers and creditors alike. Fundamentally,
there is no disparity of interest among our nations. We have a com-
mon interest in growth - sustained growth that rests on productiv-
ity, innovation and investment. Let us begin our efforts now.
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